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Summary 
This study examines whether or not the alignment between diversification and 
control—a classic concern of Chandler —holds for business groups in Taiwan. The 
central thesis from Chandler is that the fit between corporate strategy and 
organizational structure adds value to performance, whereas a misfit destroys value. 
A general implication from Chandler is that there should be an inverse relationship 
between diversification and control. However, backwardness of market institutions 
in emerging economies suggests that alignment does not necessarily mean superior 
performance. Moreover, institutionalized social relationship like family makes the 
picture more complex. The preference of family to run business groups that are 
under their primary control would outweigh the classic principles of how corporate 
strategy and structure should be organized.  
The second part of this thesis investigates the antecedents of diversification-control 
alignment. This is an important topic but has somehow been ignored by previous 
literature. I suggest that alignment at both managerial hierarchies in business group 
is more or less subject to the influence of market competition, institutional forces, 
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and the power relationship among major shareholders of a group. These three 
accounts have successfully explained the spread of M-form through multibusiness 
organizations in advanced economies, and I suppose that they are equally applicable 
to interpret the diversification/control interface for business group in Taiwan. 
The empirical analyses are based on longitudinal data of the 100 largest business 
groups in Taiwan over the period of 1981-1998. The importance of business groups 
in many emerging economies warrants me to use groups, other than individual firms, 
as the sample of analysis.  
Analytical result shows that Chandler’s argument does not hold when market is 
underdeveloped, while the benefit of alignment begins to emerge as market develops. 
Such finding suggests that market moderates the relationship between alignment and 
performance. When it comes to the antecedents of alignment, it is interesting that 
alignment at manager level is subject to the influence of product market, capital 
market, and the power landscape of major shareholders of a group, while the 
alignment at director level remains free from such influences. This finding offers 
important theoretical implications to existing literature and opens room for future 
research.
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Firm Size for Top 100 Business Groups  
Year 1981 1986 1990 1994 1998 
      
Number of Affiliated Firms 7.19 7.69 8.15 10.21 13.62 
 (5.36) (5.85) (5.06) (6.52) (8.87) 
      
Employees (thousand) 3179 3458 3962 4671 7299 
 (4962) (5703) (6655) (7080) (9302) 
      
Net Sales  (hundred of $NT million) 7252 11866 20841 28487 49497 
 (11168) (22882) (47982) (40385) (57906) 
      
Group Sales/GNP 28.6% 29.4% 39.2% 41.5% 54.3% 
      
Number of Groups 100 97 100 100 100 




Table 2. Number and Percentage of Top Ranked Manufacturing Firms that is Group 
Affiliated  
 1981 1986 1990 1994 1998 
1. Top100 59 (59%) 59 (59%) 51 (51%) 58 (58%) 69 (69%) 
2. Top200 97 (49%) 95 (48%)  79 (40%)  93 (47%)  112 (56%)  
3. Top300 132 (44%) 118 (39%)  107 (36%)  122 (41%) 146 (49%)  
4. Top400 154 (39%)  144 (36%)  127 (32%)  145 (36%)  181 (45%)  
5. Top500 182 (36%) 160 (32%)  141 (28%)  158 (32%) 202 (40%)  
Note: The variable name “Top 100” indicates the number and 
percentage of top 100 largest manufacturing firms belonging to 
business groups. Numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage. 
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Table 3. Illustrative Value of Herfindahl Index of Group Control  













Examples of Calculation 
       
1 - - - - 1  
0.95 0.5 - - - 0.9 (0.95 square) + (0.5 square) 
0.9 0.1 - - - 0.82 (0.9 square) + (0.1 square) 
0.8 0.1 0.1 - - 0.66 (0.8 square) + (0.1 square) + (0.1 square) 
0.6 0.4 - - - 0.52  
0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.40  
0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1 - 0.34  
0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.26  
0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.22  









(Herfindahl) Alignment Implication 
A 1 0 1 
Very high level of diversification with 
loose control. Good fit. 
     
B 0 1 1 
Very focused strategy with centralized 
control. Good fit. 
     
C 1 1 0 
Very high level of diversification with 
very tight control. Misfit. 
     
D 0 0 0 
Very focused strategy with highly 
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Table 5. Means, Standard Deviation, and Correlation of Main Variables for Pooled Sample 
 Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
           
1. ROA 4.79 6.04 1.00        
           
2. ROS 5.08 8.07 0.75*** 1.00       
   (0.00)        
3. Group Age 29.28 11.05 -0.03 0.07 1.00      
   (0.51) (0.13)       
4. Sales (Exponentiated) 9.21 1.27 0.09** 0.12*** 0.37*** 1.00     
   (0.04) (0.01) (0.00)      
5. Liability/Assets Ratio 0.03 0.04 -0.17*** -0.14*** -0.02 0.03 1.00    
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.71) (0.54)     
6. Total Diversification 0.73 0.46 -0.09** -0.01 0.24*** 0.28*** -0.02 1.00   
   (0.04) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.69)    
7. Director Control 0.70 0.24 0.13*** 0.06 -0.19*** -0.24*** -0.01 -0.30*** 1.00  
   (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00)   
8. Manager Control 0.52 0.25 0.08* 0.00 -0.13*** -0.34*** 0.06 -0.44*** 0.53*** 1.00 
   (0.08) (0.91) (0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00)  
9. Alignment_Dir 0.76 0.18 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.25*** -0.19*** 0.13*** 
   (0.91) (0.84) (0.17) (0.76) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
10. Alignment_Man 0.78 0.18 0.04 0.08* 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.35*** 0.07* 0.16*** 
   (0.32) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) 
11. Market Concentration 0.23 0.16 0.09* 0.06 -0.11** -0.24*** 0.07 -0.01 0.14*** 0.16*** 
   (0.06) (0.21) (0.03) (0.00) (0.14) (0.79) (0.00) (0.00) 
12. No. of Listed Firms 0.86 1.03 -0.03 0.09** 0.26*** 0.60*** -0.03 0.30*** -0.17*** -0.30*** 
   (0.55) (0.04) (0.00) (0.000 (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
13. Insider  31.65 20.97 0.04 -0.01 -0.10** -0.24*** -0.08* 0.13*** 0.03 -0.01 
   (0.39) (0.82) (0.04) (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.55) (0.78) 
14. Institutional Investor 5.75 7.14 0.03 -0.13*** -0.20*** -0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.07 
   (0.49) (0.01) (0.00) (0.14) (0.39) (0.42) (0.93) (0.16) 
15. Foreign Investor 4.37 8.61 0.18*** 0.13*** 0.08 0.14*** -0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.08 
   (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.27) (0.27) (0.40) (0.12) 
16. Government 0.52 2.89 0.04 0.10** 0.03 0.11** -0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.02 
   (0.44) (0.04) (0.51) (0.02) (0.46) (0.73) (0.32) (0.63) 
           
No. of Observations   497 497 496 497 497 495 495 494 
* p <.10 
** p < .05 
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(Continued) 
 Mean S.D. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
           
1. ROA 4.79 6.04         
           
2. ROS 5.08 8.07         
           
3. Group Age 29.28 11.05         
           
4. Sales (Exponentiated) 9.21 1.27         
           
5. Liability/Assets Ratio 0.03 0.04         
           
6. Total Diversification 0.73 0.46         
           
7. Director Control 0.70 0.24         
           
8. Manager Control 0.52 0.25         
           
9. Alignment_Dir 0.76 0.18 1.00        
           
10. Alignment_Man 0.78 0.18 0.27*** 1.00       
   (0.00)        
11. Market Concentration 0.23 0.16 0.10** 0.14*** 1.00      
   (0.04) (0.00)       
12. No. of Listed Firms 0.86 1.03 -0.09** 0.13*** -0.12*** 1.00     
   (0.04) (0.00) (0.01)      
13. Insider  31.65 20.97 -0.03 -0.04 0.09* -0.22*** 1.00    
   (0.60) (0.38) (0.07) (0.00)     
14. Institutional Investor 5.75 7.14 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.11** -0.05 1.00   
   (0.61) (0.95) (0.96) (0.03) (0.32)    
15. Foreign Investor 4.37 8.61 -0.09** 0.09** 0.01 0.05 -0.14*** -0.01 1.00  
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.89) (0.28) (0.00) (0.90)   
16. Government 0.52 2.89 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 1.00 
   (0.83) (0.27) (0.68) (0.85) (0.12) (0.80) (0.75)  
           
No. of Observations   497 497 443 496 438 438 438 438 
* p <.10 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01 
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Table 6. Means and Standard Deviation of Main Variables by Years 
Year 1981 1986 1990 1994 1998 
      
1. Return on Assets (ROA) 2.48 6.97 4.86 6.14 3.55 
 (3.50) (5.61) (5.91) (5.83) (7.57) 
      
2. Return on Sales (ROS) 2.49 5.73 4.89 8.44 3.88 
 (4.22) (4.67) (9.60) (8.65) (10.01) 
      
3. Group Age 23.22 27.15 29.58 32.37 33.95 
 (8.73) (9.48) (9.92) (11.22) (12.28) 
      
4. Sales (Exponentiated) 8.32 8.67 9.05 9.64 10.35 
 (0.99) (1.08) (1.22) (1.05) (0.92) 
      
5. Liability/Assets Ratio 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) 
      
6. Total Diversification 0.69 0.68 0.79 0.74 0.76 
 (0.45) (0.46) (0.42) (0.45) (0.49) 
      
7. Director Control 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.68 0.63 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24) 
      
8. Manager Control 0.59 0.52 0.58 0.48 0.45 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.23) (0.25) (0.25) 
      
9. Alignment_Dir 0.78 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.78 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.18) (0.15) (0.16) 
      
10. Alignment_Man 0.79 0.73 0.81 0.78 0.78 
 (0.15) (0.24) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) 
      
11. Market Concentration 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.05 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.08) 
      
12. No. of Listed Firms 0.52 0.53 0.77 1.15 1.31 
 (0.83) (0.93) (0.87) (1.07) (1.16) 
      
13. Insider Ownership 33.83 34.45 35.53 31.82 24.11 
 (21.40) (22.56) (22.10) (20.49) (16.82) 
      
14. Institutional Ownership 5.37 5.56 6.13 5.96 5.57 
 (7.17) (6.93) (7.12) (6.05) (8.29) 
      
15. Government Ownership 0.39 0.33 0.26 0.38 1.15 
 (1.95) (1.78) (1.57) (1.61) (5.16) 
      
16. Foreign Ownership 4.03 4.44 4.26 4.88 4.14 
 (7.83) (9.32) (8.80) (8.98) (8.09) 
      
No. of Groups 100 97 100 100 100 
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Table 7. Regression of Return-on-Assets on Alignment and Control Variables 
DV= ROA Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Base Line Main Effect Main Effect Main Effect 
 (1981-1998) (1981-1998) (1981-1990) (1994-1998) 
     
ROA_t-2 0.071 0.045 -0.095 -0.332** 
 (0.290) (0.505) (0.347) (0.039) 
Group Age -0.054 -0.063 0.102 -0.264* 
 (0.318) (0.237) (0.251) (0.054) 
Group Sales (Exponentiated) 1.581** 1.912** 4.367*** 0.916 
 (0.038) (0.013) (0.006) (0.684) 
Liability/Assets Ratio -6.955 -6.124 -3.040 -47.994 
 (0.396) (0.451) (0.735) (0.704) 
Market Concentration 5.703*** 6.172*** 2.497 16.223*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.404) (0.003) 
Total Diversification -3.470*** -4.567*** -5.569** -9.166*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.012) (0.008) 
Industry Dummies (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
     
Alignment_Dir  -4.096* -3.556 -7.027 
  (0.092) (0.335) (0.160) 
Alignment_Man  5.605** 2.869 13.136** 
  (0.024) (0.424) (0.033) 
     
R-square 0.11 0.13 0.20 0.63 
No. of Observations 393 393 238 155 
* p <.10 
** p < .05 
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Table 8. Regression on Alignment at Manager Level 
DV= Alignment_Man_t+4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 









 (1981-1994) (1981-1994) (1981-1994) (1981-1994) (1981-1994) 
      
Alignment _Man -0.254*** -0.329*** -0.264*** -0.406*** -0.476*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Group Age 0.003* 0.004* 0.003 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.085) (0.064) (0.121) (0.028) (0.021) 
Group Sales (Exponentiated) -0.044** -0.056** -0.049** -0.060** -0.096*** 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.023) (0.022) (0.001) 
Liability/Assets Ratio -0.050 -0.005 -0.038 -0.033 0.007 
 (0.828) (0.982) (0.869) (0.880) (0.975) 
Industry Dummies (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
      
Market Concentration  -0.129*   -0.140** 
  (0.091)   (0.049) 
No. of Listed Firms   0.024  0.050** 
   (0.239)  (0.044) 
Insider    0.002 0.003 
    (0.176) (0.120) 
Institutional Investor    -0.001 -0.002 
    (0.747) (0.760) 
Foreign Investor    0.015*** 0.016*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Government    0.069 0.094** 
    (0.139) (0.043) 
      
R-square 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.29 0.37 
No. of Observations 353 248 353 263 240 
* p <.10 
** p < .05 
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Table 9. Regression on Alignment at Director Level 
DV= Alignment_Dir_t+4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 









 (1981-1994) (1981-1994) (1981-1994) (1981-1994) (1981-1994) 
      
Alignment _Dir -0.113* -0.255*** -0.114* -0.176** -0.240** 
 (0.108) (0.006) (0.109) (0.045) (0.013) 
Group Age -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 
 (0.438) (0.675) (0.426) (0.876) (0.927) 
Group Sales (Exponentiated) 0.011 -0.004 0.010 0.027 0.002 
 (0.635) (0.896) (0.665) (0.339) (0.959) 
Liability/Assets Ratio 0.009 0.028 0.012 0.021 0.041 
 (0.971) (0.910) (0.964) (0.933) (0.867) 
Industry Dummies (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
      
Market Concentration  -0.090   -0.087 
  (0.259)   (0.282) 
No. of Listed Firms   0.005  0.027 
   (0.834)  (0.325) 
Insider    0.001 0.002 
    (0.509) (0.405) 
Institutional Investor    -0.004 -0.005 
    (0.439) (0.424) 
Foreign Investor    0.000 0.000 
    (0.954) (0.937) 
Government    -0.069 -0.055 
    (0.183) (0.296) 
      
R-square 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.15 
No. of Observations 353 248 353 263 240 
* p <.10 
** p < .05 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the antecedents and outcome of the alignment between 
diversification and control—a classic concern of Chandler (1962, 1990). The central 
thesis from Chandler is that the fit between corporate strategy and organizational 
structure benefit performance. After business enterprises grow by adding a number 
of new product lines to achieve economy of scale and scope, they need to 
decentralize coordination and control authority to deal with managerial overload and 
information overload (Chandler, 1992). The adoption of multidivisional form 
reflects such decentralization process. What is behind the apparent trend among 
most of the large multibusiness companies towards the M-form actually relates to 
the willingness to re-achieve the alignment between diversification and control, 
which has been undermined during the aggressive strategic expansion. A more 
general implication from Chandler is that there should be an inverse relationship 
between diversification and control for proper firm configuration.  
Although scholars that followed Chandler (e.g., Channon, 1973; Rumelt, 1974; 
Suzuki, 1980; Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993; Whittington and Mayer, 2000) have 
documented the spread of multidivisional form among large industrial companies in 
developed markets, few scholars have paid enough attention to late-industrializing 
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countries, nor has Chandler’s argument been tested for business groups. It is not 
clear whether or not the performance implication of the alignment between 
diversification and control still holds for business groups in emerging markets. Two 
reasons prompted me to cast such doubt.  
In the first place, the institutional context of emerging economy is significantly 
different from those of mature markets. Backwardness of factor markets in emerging 
economy makes it possible for business enterprises to achieve exceptional growth 
rate without paying enough attention to strategy-structure alignment. For instance, 
part of competitive advantage of business groups stems from “contact ability” (Kock 
and Guillen, 2001) and “project execution ability” (Amsden and Hikino, 1994). 
These abilities are not industry specific, and thus can be applied in a number of 
businesses. Based on these abilities, unrelated diversification and tight control by 
founding entrepreneur (or his family) represents the mainstream corporate model in 
Korea and Taiwan (Whitley, 1999). This model is still considered to be viable after 
the financial crisis. However, such strategy/structure arrangement apparently 
conflicts with western management norms, which require decentralized structure for 
multibusiness firms.   
 - 2 -  
In the second place, institutionalized social structure like family would have strong 
impact on the alignment between strategy and structure in late-developing countries. 
In Chandler’s model, the separation of ownership from operational management is 
the basic feature of corporate governance. Although Chandler also talked about 
family capitalism in United Kingdom, family is in most cases decoupled from 
practical management. However, in late-industrializing economies like Taiwan, 
family as the dominant shareholder still controls key management authorities 
(Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000). The pressure for business groups to pass its 
decision-making rights to lower level professional managers contradicts with the 
family’s propensity to retain as much power as possible.  
The above two considerations make it difficult to apply Chandler’s theory on 
strategy and structure directly in emerging context. In addition, business groups 
seem to be incompatible with classic theories in corporate governance as well. On 
the one hand, while business groups usually extend to multiple industries, they lack 
formal managerial hierarchy. Business groups are a federation of loose-coupled 
individual firms (Chung, 2001; Granovetter, 1995). They are short of the formal 
structure like functional form or multidivisional form. On the other hand, the key 
decision making rights may be tightly concentrated at the hand of a small clan of 
people. Such configuration contradicts with the arguments of Chandler (1962, 1990, 
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1992) and Williamson (1975), which insist that managerial complexity leads to 
formal and decentralized structure. In this sense, it is not clear whether the fit 
between corporate strategy and organizational control as advocated by Chandler is 
still meaningful to business groups or not. The first objective of this paper is to 
examine Chandler’s argument in Taiwan to see whether it is still valid irrespective 
of context. If the empirical result turns out to be supportive, this study would 
promote the theoretical scope of Chandler’s argument. If evidence appears to be 
inconsistent with Chandler, this study will help to draw theoretical boundaries for 
Chandler’s arguments. 
On top of Chandler’s theoretical framework, Kock and Guillen (2001) proposed a 
new evolutionary model to depict the strategic and structural trend of business 
groups. Their model incorporates the market imperfection and the resource-based 
view into corporate evolution. Although alignment is still what the model advocate, 
they suggested a reverse direction of strategy and structure change. This study can 
also help to examine to what extent Kock and Guillen’s theory captures the reality in 
the path of group development in Taiwan. 
The second main objective of this article targets at the determinants of 
diversification-control alignment. Although a number of previous studies (e.g. 
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Chang and Choi, 1988; Channon, 1973; Rumelt, 1974; Suzuki, 1980; Hoskisson, 
Hill, and Kim, 1993) have mentioned the benefit of alignment on performance, we 
know little about antecedents of the alignment. We do not know why some 
companies can maintain a good alignment between diversification and control, but 
others cannot. What explains the variance of diversification/control alignment 
among firms remains largely unclear. While some studies argue that strategy 
determines structure (Andrews, 1971; Hamilton and Shergill, 1992; Nelson, 1994; 
Willamson, 1975), and others shed light on how structure restraints strategic 
decisions (Bower, 1970; Child, 1972; Fredrickson, 1986), there is no consensus 
about the causal relationship. In this case, it might be advisable to look at how other 
exogenous factors that would simultaneously affect the strategy and structure of 
firms thus matter to alignment. Based on previous studies on how M-form became 
the dominant structure among multibusiness firms (Chandler, 1962; Clark and 
Soulsby, 1999; Fligstein, 1985; Fligstein and Freeland, 1995; Palmer, Friedland, 
Jennings, Powers, 1987; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993), I propose that 
efficiency consideration, institutional forces, and stakeholder’s interest are three 
main antecedents of alignment. 
The empirical analyses are based on longitudinal data of the 100 largest business 
groups in Taiwan over the period of 1981-1998. The importance of business groups 
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in many emerging economies (Chang and Choi, 1988; Chang and Hong, 2000; 
Guillen, 2000; Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Carrera 
et al., 2003), including Taiwan, warrants me to use groups, other than individual 
firms, as the unit of analysis. However, the differences between groups and 
multibusiness firms cast doubts on using existing concepts and measures to test 
Chandler’s theory for groups. Therefore, the third objective of this paper is to 
develop measures that can capture the strategic and structural feature for groups. 
Following the first step by Chung, Mahmood, and Feng (2004), I formulate an index 
to measure coordination/control and the alignment at the group level. Based on 
Chandler’s argument, I would expect alignment between diversification and control 
to have positive impact on performance.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, two sets of background 
information, economic significance of business groups in Taiwan and strategy and 
structure characteristics of the groups will be introduced. In Chapter 3, I will review 
two sets of relevant previous studies. The first set is about the impacts of 
diversification/control alignment on performance, and the other is on determinants 
of alignment. Details of data sources and the way I construct the measures will be 
elaborated in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 will show results, discussion, and conclusion.  
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CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND OF BUSINESS GROUPS 
1. Definition 
Business group is a common phenomenon in a variety of economies. A lot of 
previous studies have paid attention to this organizational form (Chang and Choi, 
1988; Chung, 2001; Granovetter, 1995; Hamilton, 1997; Khanna and Palepu, 1999; 
Khanna and Rivkin 2001; Kock and Guillen, 2001; Strachan, 1976). Early definition 
(Strachan, 1976) describes business group as “long-term association of a great 
diversity of firms and the men who own and manage these firms”. Granovetter 
(1995) acknowledged the necessary arbitrariness to define the boundary of business 
group. In his definition, business groups are “collections of firms bound together in 
some formal and/or informal ways… integrated neither completely nor barely at all”. 
So defined, Granovetter (1995) excluded typical American conglomerates which 
were usually formed and divested on the basis of financial optimization, a form short 
of “social solidarity and social structure among component firms”.  
Most recent definitions are consistent with Strachan’s (1976) and Granovetter’s 
(1995) approach, but have developed more specific conceptual connotation and 
extension. Chang and Hong (2000) characterized business groups as “a gathering of 
formally independent firms under the single common administrative and financial 
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control of one family”. While this definition has limited generalizability in that 
family control is not ubiquitously the case for business groups in every emerging 
market (e.g. Japanese Keiretsu), it well reflects the feature in Korean and Taiwanese 
business groups. In line with Chang and Hong (2000), Chung’s (2001) definition is 
more comprehensive. He conceptualizes business groups as “a set of legally 
independent firm that link to each other through various economic and social 
relationships, and operate in a coherent manner”. There are three noteworthy 
features in such definition. First, legal dependence distinguishes business groups 
from multidivisional firms and conglomerates. Second, the evident diversity in the 
structure of business groups is reflected by various economic and social 
relationships. Third, operating coherence implicates that certain pattern of 
coordination and control system exists in business groups. “Coherence” helps to 
distinguish business groups from holding companies, whose affiliations run 
autonomously without regular business and investment coordination. These three 
elements in Chung’s definition have clarified some conceptual ambiguities in early 
definitions. Common types of business groups include keiretsu in Japan, chaebol in 
Korea, grupos economicos in Latin America, and business houses in India. In my 
dataset, the oldest business group in Taiwan was established in 1918. 
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It has been more than twenty years since business groups began to draw scholarly 
attention. But why should one study business groups, other than individual firms in 
the first place? Previous researches suggest that in certain countries that emphasize 
collaborative networks in social economic structure, it would be more appropriate to 
treat business groups as the basic unit of analysis if one were to discuss the strategy-
structure interface in organizational dynamics (Chung 2001; Granovetter, 1995; 
Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Kock and Guillen, 2001). Two factors promote such an 
approach: the apparent significance of business groups in national economy and 
their distinctive strategy and structure.  
2. Economic Significance of Business Groups in Taiwan 
The economic importance of business groups is a striking feature in nearly every 
emerging economy (Granovetter 1995; Khanna and Rivkin 2001). In Taiwan, 
business groups are the leading players in the market. Group-affiliated firms are 
important to Taiwan’s economy in terms of their contribution in total number of 
employees, number of affiliated firms, and net sales. In 1998, the biggest 100 
business groups employed 7,298,550 employees and accounted for about 54.3 per 
cent of gross national product (GNP). More detailed descriptions are given in Table 
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1. The influence of Japanese Keiretsu and Korean Chaebol is even larger in their 
respective markets (Chang and Hong, 2000). 
[Table 1  about here] 
[Table 2  about here] 
Another evidence for the economic importance of Taiwanese business groups is that 
most Taiwanese manufacturing firms are group-affiliated. Table 2 summarizes the 
number and ratio of top 100 to top 500 manufacturing firms that belong to business 
groups over the 18 years. It shows that more than half of the manufacturing firms are 
affiliated with business groups and the ratio peaked in 1998, reaching almost 70 per 
cent. In addition, the number and percentage also increased stably in the period 
between 1981 and 1998, manifesting a clear upward trend. Although previous 
research has commented that Taiwanese business groups are more tightly clustered 
in manufacturing sectors, as compared with their counterparts in Japan and in Korea 
(Hamilton, 1997), recent data indicates an equivalent density of top ranked group-
affiliated firms in service industries in Taiwan. In 1994, 52 firms out of the top 100 
ranked (52%) and 82 out of top 200 (41%) in service sector belong to business 
groups. The percentage is supposed to be even higher in succeeding years in that 
groups continue to jump into some vibrant service industries in order to take the 
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advantage of opportunities opened by deregulation (Chung, Mahmood, and Feng, 
2004).  
In sum, current information clearly suggests that, as a primary feature in Taiwan’s 
economy, business groups played a critical role in the focal two decades during 
Taiwan’s industrialization.  
3. Strategy and Structure of Business Groups 
As compared with the western industrial organizations, business groups have some 
distinctive features in strategy and structure. Concerning strategy, most business 
groups in Taiwan have diversified into multiple product lines. While diversification 
is generally considered to destroy profitability in mature economies (Hoskisson and 
Hitt, 1990), this strategy would add value in emerging economies (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1999, 2001). Chung, Mahmood and Feng (2004, p.5) argued that 
“diversification allows groups to replicate some of the functions provided by stand-
alone institutions in more mature economies which are either absent or poorly 
developed in emerging markets.” Although diversification in the long run is likely to 
become less beneficial as new institutions emerge, in the short run, the intermediary 
capabilities of diversified groups “are likely to become more, not less, valuable for 
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exploiting new business opportunities in the economy” (Khanna and Palepu, 1999, 
p.279).  
Other studies (Fisman, 2001; Guillen, 2000; Peng, 2003) offered more specific 
mechanisms that groups, especially those having rich political connections, were 
better positioned for tapping into the new opportunities in immature market. A 
spearhead among these arguments is from Kock and Guillen (2001), who offered a 
new explanation to the extensive diversification of business groups from the 
resource-based view. In their perspective, the “contact ability”, defined as the 
external linkage to powerful institutions and agents, of business group is a critical 
resource for success at the early development stage. When existing firms plan to 
diversify into other product lines or services, they do not need to follow a related 
pattern because their internal capacity, the “contacts”, is neither asset-specific nor 
product-specific. Entrepreneurs can choose to expand their business empire by 
diversifying into whatever industries that they can make use of their contacts with 
domestic resource holders and/or foreign partners.   
Concerning structure, while business groups are similar to multibusiness firms (or 
conglomerates) in a way that both participate in wide varieties of product markets, 
“business groups are distinguished by the institutionalized relationships such as 
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cross-shareholding and interlocking directorate among their member firms” (Chung, 
Mahmood, and Feng, 2004, p.8). Such network relationships are often sustained by 
existing social structures, such as family and ethnic ties (Chung, Mahmood, and 
Feng, 2004; Granovetter, 1995; Khanna and Rivkin, 2002). The network structure in 
business groups more or less mirrors the imperfection of market institutions in late 
industrializing economies. Individual corporations are key actors in western 
economy. In contrast, business groups are major players in the emerging market. 
Within a group, firms do not operate as separated units. They are organized along 
institutionalized relationships and cooperate as an integral entity. To consider 
business groups as the basic analytical unit (the other is the non group-affiliated 
firms) enables us to capture the unique dynamics in both microeconomic 
organization and the entire business system in Asian economy. At the micro level, 
both strategic decisions on business profile and the structural arrangement are 
centered on group interest rather than firm’s goal. At the macro level, the influence 
of market on enterprises is better reflected by groups such influences are buffered by 
group resources. Actually, this advocate of treating the group as the basic 
organizational unit is not limited to the case in Taiwan, but is equally applicable in 
Korea, Japan, and other emerging markets as well. 
Although it is difficult to classify the structure of business groups in terms of formal 
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functional, holding, or multidivisional form, it is still possible to differentiate them 
along the continuum of concentration level in coordination and control. As Hamilton 
and his associates (Hamilton 1997, Hamilton and Kao 1990, Orrù et al. 1991) have 
pointed out, there is less hierarchical control in Taiwan’s business groups as 
compared to the Korean chaebol, but more coordination than the Japanese keiretsu. 
Similarly, Chung, Mahmood, and Feng (2004) mentioned that if we set the Korean 
chaebol and Japanese keiretsu at the two ends of the centralization continuum, “the 
management system of Taiwan’s business groups locates in the middle” (p.8). The 
major coordination mechanism inside business groups in Taiwan is not hinged upon 
a single person such as the group president, nor a community such as the president’s 
club, but a set of closely-related leaders whom Hamilton named the “inner circle”. 
This faction of people may simultaneously occupy multiple commanding positions 
such as board chair and chief executive in member firms and they usually determine 
the course of strategic planning (Chung, 2003). 
[Figure 1  about here] 
Figure 1 illustrates the coordination/control system of the inner circle in a business 
group. Suppose Group A has 10 member firms which are under control of four 
leaders. The key leader, who is often the founder or heir of the founder of the group, 
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commands five member firms and the other three core leaders control the rest five 
firms. Field studies (Hamilton and Kao, 1990; Hamilton, 1997) have shown that 
there is no formal administrative organization at the group level in Taiwan’s 
business groups (i.e., the central office in Korean chaebol). Chung (2003) argued 
that the coordination/control of group business relied on existing social ties among 
key leaders like family ties, entrepreneurial partnership, and long-term employment. 
The family authority relationships and the mutual trust among the key leader and 
other leaders are the underpinning foundation upon which the group business is 
constructed and sustained. 
Another striking structural feature of Taiwan’s business groups is the “duplicate 
hierarchy” (Hamilton, 1997). Such arrangement reflects a separation of strategic 
planning and daily operation management at two distinct authority levels. While 
goal setting, strategic planning, resource coordination, and external buffering usually 
concentrate at the hands of directors, most routine managerial tasks have been 
endowed to the manager of each firm. The position of director is ordinarily assumed 
by group owners, typically the founder or his successors, a few close family 
members, and those who the owner trusted most and included in the inner circle 
(Hamilton, 1997; Chung, 2001). In contrast, managers are not necessarily the 
members of the family or the inner circle. Most people with the name card as 
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operational managers have professional management background in terms their 
education and career. Such director-manager dichotomy in the administrative 
hierarchy distinguishes Taiwan’s business groups from their counterparts in Japan 
and Korea. However, what makes the two-layer structure even more complex is that 
both manager and director can be assumed by a single individual, and one individual 
can simultaneously take multiple positions either as operational manager in member 
firms or as group director. Such arrangement would reinforce the family dominance 
in business groups in the sense that family members and family affiliates can be 
tactically allocated to managerial positions so as to maximize the family’s influence. 
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CHAPTER III. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
1. Strategy, Structure, and Alignment 
Strategy and structure of industrial organizations have been a popular issue for a 
long time in organizational and policy studies. Most previous research has focused 
on the process of how strategy drives structural change, while others have addressed 
how current structure sets constraint on the strategy options. There is an 
inconclusive debate between the two streams of argument.  
Chandler (1962) and Williamson (1975) belong to the first camp, who point out that 
multidivisional form can best cooperate with the diversification strategy in that it 
resolves the problem of managerial overload and information overload. In their 
description, the strategic expansion is the initial step, and the transformation from 
functional form to M-form follows. Similarly, Amburgey and Dacin (1994), 
Andrews (1971), Nelson (1994), and Penrose (1959) also agree that strategy 
determines structure, not the other way round. In their perspective, it is the strategy 
that reflects the key objective of the firm, and the main purpose of structure or 
structural change is to smoothly implement the strategy.   
Contrary to the strategy-determining approach, some organizational scholars 
(Fredrickson, 1986; Bower, 1970) emphasize the impacts that organizational 
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structure has on strategy. For instance, Bower (1970) reminded that organizational 
structure not only set the framework of current management operations, but imposed 
restrictions on how information will flow throughout the organization. Fredrickson 
(1986) also argued that studies on the relationship between strategy and structure 
had not been fully explored, and scholars frequently ignored or underestimated the 
possibility that structure imposed limitation on both the process and outcome of 
strategic decisions. In sum, the impacts of structure come from the constraint of 
access to information, resources, and available options of strategy.   
While the above debate is not conclusive, another group of studies suggest that the 
relationship between strategy and structure may not be as fixed as people believe 
(Child, 1972, 1997; Harris and Ruefli, 2000; Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). In some 
cases, the prior purpose of reorganization is to help implement strategic change, 
while in other cases reorganization per se becomes the objective for its own sake. 
Harris and Ruefli (2000) noted that whether strategy determines structure or 
otherwise were not absolute. They suggest a cyclic pattern of “strategy-structure-
strategy-structure” dynamics.  
Throughout the strategy-structure debate, a consensus underlying the competing 
arguments is that there should be an alignment between strategy and structure. What 
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matters to performance may not be whether it is strategy or structure that drives the 
other. Rather, performance is the function of the interface between strategy and 
structure. In other words, the strategy/structure fit per se is a more important 
determinant to performance than the processes of how such fit is achieved. For 
example, Chandler advocates that M-form matches diversification strategy, and F-
form fits focused firms. Scholars that followed Chandler have demonstrated that the 
adoption of M-form can help to achieve superior performance among large 
industrial organizations. What is behind the (early) popularity of M-form is that this 
structural innovation provides an option that top managers in multi-product 
companies could adopt to enhance the strategy-structure fit. Given that performance 
is the ultimate consideration, to study the relationship between strategy and structure 
is therefore at least as meaningful as to investigate them separately. In this study, the 
construct diversification/control alignment is introduced to capture the relationship 
between strategy and structure.  
The informal structure of business groups in Taiwan makes it more difficult to 
discuss their diversification/control interactions. However, such attempt is not 
impossible. It is worthy of mentioning that the loose coupling of member firms as 
characteristic of group structure in Taiwan does not necessarily mean the loose 
control. As I have mentioned earlier, the authority of strategic planning, resource 
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allocation, external buffering, and other key decisions are concentrated in the hands 
of a small group of people called “inner circle”. The “inner circle” consists of the 
pinnacle of the power pyramid, and in most cases, takes the official position as 
group directors. “Inner circle” in business groups by and large parallels the 
headquarter of multidivisional firms in developed markets. The rest of the daily 
operation management authority is endowed to firm level managers. In this sense, 
the issue of alignment actually refers to two levels of organizational hierarchy: 
director level (approximation of “inner circle”) and manager level. While alignment 
at director level measures the fit between diversification and director control, 
alignment at manager level gauges the interface between diversification and the 
concentration of management authority at operation level.  
2. The Link between Alignment and Performance of Business Groups in Taiwan 
Alignment is defined as the degree of fit between diversification strategy and 
structure of a business organization. In particular, I concentrate on diversification 
strategy and the centralization in coordination and control, one of the most critical 
dimensions in organizational structure, for business groups in this article. High 
alignment means a good fit between diversification and control, while low alignment 
indicates a misfit. For instance, M-form as decentralized structure matches multi-
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product organizations, and functional form is an appropriate arrangement for 
focused firms, therefore the diversification/control alignment for the two 
combinations are high. If focused firms adopt decentralized structure, or diversified 
firms use concentrated structure, the alignment will be low. Chandler (1962, 1990, 
1992) believed that large firms with many products and diverse geographic markets 
would face coordination and control problems. Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou (1993) 
summarized that “preoccupation with these matters (coordination and control 
problems) in turn causes firms to overlook long-range strategic concerns. The M-
form is believed to accommodate these hazards of complex strategies and large size. 
The arrangement of human and physical capital into semiautonomous business 
reduces coordination and control problems, and the separation of strategic from 
tactical decision making assures proper attention to strategic opportunities and 
threats” (p.102). Chung, Mahmood, and Feng (2004) also commented that “…while 
centralized control may benefit focused firms by reducing transaction costs, failure 
by diversified firms to decentralize hurts performance by overloads in managerial 
tasks and organizational capabilities” (p. 2).  
Transaction cost economists (Williamson, 1975; Teece, 1980) largely follow 
Chandler’s theory. A major contribution of transaction cost approach is that it 
attributes the increased efficiency from M-form to the internal capital market. In 
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TCE (Transactional Cost Economics) perspective, headquarters of multidivisional 
firms can allocate financial resources among existing product divisions more 
efficiently than the external financial markets.  
Both Chandler and TCE theorists agree that the fit between multi-product strategy 
and M-form adds value to financial performance. Most studies that tried to test 
Chandler’s argument took the popularity of M-form among large business 
organizations as the main supporting evidence (e.g. Rumelt, 1974; Channon, 1973; 
Suzuki, 1980; Fligstein, 1990; Whittington, Mayer, and Curto, 1999; Mayer and 
Whittington, 1999; 2003). Only a small number of studies have looked at the direct 
effect of strategy-structure fit on performance. Donaldson (1987) and Hamilton and 
Shergill (1992) belong to the few, who find a positive relationship between 
alignment and performance.  
Although existing studies have shed light on the relationship between alignment and 
performance, how much alignment matters to business groups in emerging economy 
remains unknown. Most of the empirical supports for Chandler’s argument come 
from developed countries, in which market institutions are fledged, property rights 
are well protected, and legislation and social norms on corporate governance are 
comparatively stable. It is not clear whether the benefit of strategy/structure 
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alignment to managerial efficiency and performance is conditional on contextual 
factors or not. In emerging markets like Taiwan, business groups are embedded in a 
social economic environment, which is significantly different from those of mature 
economies. It is to be tested whether or not Chandler’s theory is valid for business 
groups in Taiwan. There are primarily two factors that prompt me to ask this 
question: (a) market imperfection; and (b) family dominance. 
2.1 Market Imperfection 
Market imperfection would moderate the relationship between alignment and 
performance. Backwardness of market institutions is the basic feature in nearly 
every emerging economy (Khanna and Palepu, 1999), and it can be a double edge 
sword for business. On the one hand, it is difficult to obtain investment capital, state 
of the art technology, advanced labor skills, and experienced management in 
emerging markets. The shortage of these production factors sets powerful constraint 
to the development of a company. On the other hand, government sponsorship, 
unmonitored authority intervention, trade and foreign investment protectionism, and 
authority’s relative free disposition of key resource make it possible for some 
enterprises to achieve exceptional growth rate without paying too much attention to 
the construction of appropriate strategy and structure. Most of these privilege or 
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special resources are neither product-specific nor one-off. They can be used 
repeatedly in multiple industries as long as market imperfection persists. In addition, 
not every firm has equal chance to take advantage from the underdeveloped market.  
During the early industrialization stage in emerging countries, privileged access to 
key resources are limited within a small number of entrepreneurs, who usually build 
up their business empire by aggressively entering into a number of unrelated 
industries. A good example is that in Korea, only a few tycoons have high priority to 
receive substantial government support. As a result, about twenty Chaebols founded 
by these entrepreneurs were able to monopolize a large number of industries in 
Korea. In Taiwan, mainlander entrepreneurs, especially those with extensive ties 
with KMT government, also guaranteed their early success from a variety of 
governmental endorsement. These special market characteristics make the decision 
of which industry to enter depending more on opportunism than competence or 
efficiency. The export oriented policy in the early period of Taiwan’s economic 
bloom further facilitated the opportunistic business behaviors. This process 
delineates the mainstream model that business groups in Korea and Taiwan come 
into being. As a result, most business groups in Korea and Taiwan operate in diverse 
product lines, and they are tightly controlled by the founding entrepreneur and/or his 
family (Chung, Mahmood, and Feng, 2004). Although the model still seems viable, 
 - 24 -  
it is obviously beyond the horizon of Chandler’s classic theorems on how business 
organizations should be configured.  
Despite a few literatures that have highlighted the importance of underdeveloped 
market to the organizations in late-industrializing economies (Chang and Choi, 1988; 
Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Hoskisson, Johnson, Yiu, and 
Wan 2001; Guillen, 2000), seldom has any research discussed the issue of how 
market imperfection affects alignment-performance dynamics. One exception is the 
three-stage evolutional model by Kock and Guillen’s (2001), which integrates 
contextual factors into Chandler’s classic thesis and resource based view of firms 
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Teece, 1994, 1997). The authors argue that 
business groups would move from high diversification and decentralized control to 
low diversification and high centralized control as the economy moves from initial 
stage to mature phase. This evolutionary pattern implies that the strategy and 
structure alignment maintains throughout the development process, which is 
consistent with Chandler’s central idea. The primary difference between Kock and 
Guillen’s model and Chandler’s argument, however, concentrates on the direction of 
strategic and structural change. In western contexts studied by Chandler and his 
associates, alignment moves from low diversification and centralized control 
(functional form) to high diversification and decentralized control (multidivisional 
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form); whereas in Kock and Guillen’s (2001) model, the movement is reversed. In 
other words, market imperfection in emerging markets would not affect the nature of 
alignment but the direction of diversification/control interaction underlying the 
alignment. Although Kock and Guillen’s proposition is grounded by sound 
theoretical deduction, it lacks persuasive data to strengthen the argument.  
I also agree that market imperfection does not completely deny the value of 
alignment. The problem of managerial and information overload should be the same 
for business groups as for multibusiness companies in western markets where 
Chandler’s argument is correct. Therefore, the alignment between high 
diversification and decentralized control should more or less benefit managerial 
efficiency, irrespective to context. Such managerial efficiency will add value to 
group performance. On the basis of the above considerations, I propose that 
alignment benefits group performance: 
Hypothesis 1: Diversification/control alignment is positively related 
with group performance.  
Although alignment is believed to be beneficial in general, the extent to which it 
will add value to organizational performance may be moderated by market 
development. In underdeveloped markets, if a company has low 
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diversification/control alignment but can leverage on other capabilities like “contact 
ability” (Kock and Guillen, 2001) and “project execution ability” (Amsden and 
Hikino, 1994), it will still perform well. In this situation, loss from a bad alignment 
would be offset by other tangible benefit stemming from uneven opportunities in an 
inefficient market. However, market institutions per se are not without change. In 
the long run market institutions develop as business organizations become mature. 
When market institutions are more efficient, and capital, technology, and labor skills 
are more available on an equal basis, there will be stronger competition among local 
companies and foreign MNCs. Eventually, firms that are more efficient will survive 
while the less efficient ones will be eliminated. In this case, business organizations, 
which previously might not have paid much attention to alignment and efficiency 
issue, will find themselves competing in the market based more on the principle of 
efficiency. In sum, when market mechanism improves, the association between 
alignment and performance will be stronger.  
Taiwan has experienced a large wave of economic liberalization in its recent history 
from the late 1980s to early 1990s. The market-centered transitions opened up 
product markets, financial markets, and labor markets that were previously 
monopolized by state- or party-owned enterprises. The changes were so fundamental, 
comprehensive, and pervasive in the social economic environment that some 
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scholars parallel it to the transformation in China, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
(Wu, 1994). Those changes to a large extent facilitate the improvement of market 
mechanisms, which in turn allow the benefit of alignment to emerge. Business 
groups with low alignment may have to restructure in order to thrive or survive in 
face of the ongoing context.  
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between diversification/control 
alignment and group performance will be stronger when market 
institution improves.  
2.2 Family Dominance in Business Group 
Besides underdeveloped market institutions in 1980s, family dominance is another 
striking organizational feature among business groups in Taiwan. Family is the most 
important shareholder among Taiwan’s business groups, and tight family control is a 
common phenomenon in private business (Hamilton, 1997). It is important to 
acknowledge that high family control does not necessarily require family to be the 
absolute dominant shareholder. Cross share holding among member firms enables 
family to retain centralized control over large assets with relatively small portion of 
ownership.  
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Family dominance can influence the degree of diversification/control alignment and 
modify the relationship between alignment and performance. Actually there is a 
trade-off between the incentive of groups to restructure their business empire for 
better alignment and the preference of family to grasp as much power and control as 
possible. On the one hand, family directors are conservative to adopt decentralized 
control, like multidivisional form, which would expose family to the hazard of self-
interest pursuit by powerful managers. The centralized structure can insulate the 
involvement of professional managers in strategic and tactical decision making 
(Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, and Turner, 1968; Palmer, Friedland, Jennings, and 
Powers, 1987; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993). On the other hand, as business 
groups grow, diversified product portfolio requires more sophisticated managerial 
talents. The managerial complexity may be beyond the disposition capacity of 
family members, thus family have to relocate some of the ordinary decision-making 
authority to firm level managers (professional managers). In this case, it is 
reasonable to see that families are extremely cautious to lessen its control at strategic 
level, where the conflicting interest between family and managers are more 
detrimental. In contrast, at operation level, family’s greater reliance on professional 
managers makes it more open to the decentralization. 
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Concerning business group in Taiwan where diversification is widespread and 
strategic management and routine management are separate in “duplicate 
hierarchies”, high family control will more or less undermine diversification/control 
alignment at strategic level. While high director control, as driven by family 
dominance, implies poor alignment at strategic level, no empirical evidence has 
showed that it hurts group performance in emerging markets. Conversely, Kock and 
Guillen (2001) argued that founding family constituted of the locus of core 
capability in business groups. Chung, Mahmood, and Feng (2004) also noticed that 
high director control and family benefited group performance in transitional context. 
In this case, I propose that Chandler’s theory is valid at the manager level but may 
not be correct at the director level. 
Hypothesis 3: Diversification/control alignment at manager level is 
positively related with group performance, while diversification/control 
alignment at director level has no effect on group performance.  
3. Antecedents of Alignment 
While strategy/structure alignment may add value to business groups in emerging 
markets, antecedents of alignment have not been well explored. Alignment, as 
defined, gauges the relationship between strategy and structure of a business 
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organization. However, there are other exogenous factors that would simultaneously 
affect strategy and structure, thus can influence to alignment. The second objective 
of this thesis is to identify those factors that may explain the diversification/control 
alignment for business groups in Taiwan. Previous literature on the popularity of 
multidivisional form helps to give some resourceful reference to define possible 
antecedents to alignment. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that both economic and sociological considerations 
are important to account for the adoption of M-form structure among multi-business 
organizations (Clark and Soulsby, 1999; Fligstein, 1985; Palmer, Friedland, 
Jennings, and Powers, 1987; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993). Chandler (1962) 
and Williamson’s (1975) argument are representatives of technical-economic 
explanation to the superiority of M-form. They argued that M-form enhanced 
managerial efficiency for diversified business organizations where functional form 
cannot. Due to the economic advantage, M-form will outperform other 
organizational forms and become the dominant structural choice for modern 
business enterprises. Although initial adoption of multidivisional form largely 
originates from efficiency considerations, organizational sociologists (Fligstein 1985, 
Palmer et al, 1987, 1993) believe that social relationships in which organizations are 
embedded are more relevant than economic approach explaining the late adoption of 
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M-form. Two main streams in sociological camp about M-form adoption are 
political accounts (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981), which focuses on the 
power of competing coalitions like ownership groups and functional departments, 
and institutional accounts (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1987), which looks at the 
legitimation processes. In power and political perspective, Child (1997) 
acknowledged that the study of structural change could not be separated from the 
analysis of parties that control the key decision making. In institutional stream, 
Fligstein (1985) found that the widespread adoption of M-form legitimized its own 
legitimacy. Since both multidivisional form and alignment reflects the basic 
relationship between strategy and structure of organizations, the above 
considerations that have successfully explained the adoption of M-form can be 
equally meaningful for the structural features of business groups. I suggest that 
technical-economic, institutional, and power and politics accounts can help identify 
the major determinants of alignment between diversification and control for business 
groups. 
3.1 Technical-Economic Account 
Chandler’s historical studies (1962, 1990, 1992) and transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1975) share common focus on the efficiency contingency in their 
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discussion of multidivisional forms. Multidivisional structure is believed to facilitate 
the execution of managerial tasks. The motive of decentralization comes from the 
greatly increased business volume and the concomitant complexity. Chandler’s 
(1962) seminal study witnessed the complexity related problems. Experiencing the 
difficulty of coordination and control that come in accordance with the large size, 
early diversified companies, such as Du Pont and General Motor, eventually 
switched to M-form in 1920s. Once emerged, multidivisional structure rapidly 
diffused throughout a variety of industries in America and other modern economies, 
primarily because it is believed to have strong economic superiority over other 
organizational forms. Williamson (1975) also implied that largeness and complexity 
of diversified modern business enterprises made traditional functional form a poor 
apparatus to control for the expansion of transaction cost. Hoskisson and his 
colleagues (1993) integrated Chandler and Williamson’s argument by introducing 
the differentiation between cooperative and competitive M-form. Cooperative M-
form benefits from economy of scale and scope, while competitive M-form 
economizes on transaction cost by allocating resources following the criteria of 
optimal return.  
Concerning business groups in Taiwan, although group structure differs from the 
multidivisional form, the underlying logic is similar. During early stage of group 
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development, the decision-making rights for business operations are concentrated at 
the hand of the founder and his close associates, who are most likely family 
members and friends of the founder. As group grows by adding new business to the 
existing product lines, the founder may depend more on professional managers to 
run some of the member firms. It is especially the case for those widely diversified 
giants such as the President Group and the Da Tong Group, which have spanned 
more than 20 industries. It is impossible for a single family to run the entire business 
empire smoothly due to its limited managerial talents, and family has to delegate 
part of its authority to divisional managers for the sake of managerial efficiency.  
Previous literature suggests that firms operating in concentrated markets are less 
likely to perceive efficiency problems. Insulation from competitive pressure can 
breed bureaucratic inefficiency (Scherer, 1980). Innovation researchers also find that 
monopoly set up entry barriers that prevent outside competitors from entering and 
thereafter secure firm’s market niche, which leads to less incentive for firms to 
innovate. While the market power that firms enjoy in concentrated market buffers 
them from intense competition (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982), it also produces 
strong inertia for firms to reorganize their strategy and structure. In contrast, the 
competitive pressure will be much stronger in competitive markets. While 
companies in concentrated market can reap premium profitability even if they do not 
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have the appropriate strategy/structure fit, firms in competitive market with low 
alignment will suffer. In order to be competitive, business organizations operating in 
atomically dispersed markets are more likely to invest resources in maintaining a 
good alignment, whereas firms may become tolerant to internal functional 
inefficiencies if they are in monopoly industries. Based on the argument, I propose 
that market concentration is negatively related with diversification/control fit for 
business groups in Taiwan. 
Hypothesis 4: External product market would influence the 
diversification/control alignment of business groups. Market 
concentration is negatively related with Diversification/control 
alignment.  
3.2 Institutional Account 
Contradicting the technical-economic efficiency considerations, institutional theory 
assumes that organizations do not choose their formal structure purely based on the 
efficiency comparison. The pursuit of “legitimacy” to satisfy the taken-for-granted 
expectation (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) is more relevant in determining forms and 
practices than efficiency considerations. The formal structure and the technical core 
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of production are decoupled so as to solve the tension if the efficient and 
institutional considerations are in conflict.  
A legitimate form is especially important when the organizational population is well 
established, where the social norms and beliefs are stable. Selznick (1957) 
considered the institutionalization as a process of instilling value, during which 
organizational structure was adaptive to external constraints for self-maintenance. 
Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou (1993) mentioned that “restricting attention to 
legitimated structures allows firms to identify efficiency-satisfying solutions to 
organizational problem while conserving time and effort” (p. 104). Clark and 
Soulsby (1999) also noted that “the adoption of structural forms over a period of 
time arises from the need for organizations to be seen to operate rationally and 
legitimately in a society where there exist both general social and specific 
management expectations about what passes for a ‘rational organization’” (p. 539). 
Because legitimacy ensures survival, firms may adopt multidivisional form even if 
their production lines prefer a functional form (e.g., with only one or few products). 
The popularity of multidivisional structure among developed countries is in part due 
to the diffusion process triggered by the social norm that it is an economically 
superior form (Fligstein, 1985).  
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Irrespective of developed markets or emerging economy, publicly listed firms are 
always more susceptible to the expectations and influences from social institutions, 
in particular, investment banks, financial analysts, and other institutional investors. 
Listed firms have the liability to disclose their corporate organization and send the 
signal to the current stakeholders or potential investors that their strategy and 
structure are properly organized and maintained, which is commonly deemed as 
presupposition for good performance. In this regard, legitimacy has stronger 
constraints for publicly listed firms in the sense that their violation of the social 
norms may lead to higher and more immediate penalty, shown in the price per share 
(Zuckerman, 1999).  
The strategy/structure alignment, which has been largely reflected in the wave of M-
form adoption among diversified industrial organizations in developed states, has 
the characteristics of a social norm. The legitimation of the alignment is backed by 
decades of research in the organizational field, business education, and the practice. 
The rule like image (cultural image) of alignment should not be limited within the 
western states, but easily flows to other context (Hannan, Carroll, Dundon, and 
Torres, 1995). The diffusion of cultural image of an organizational form can be 
facilitated by the impact of mass media, foreign direct investment, and trades. In this 
regard, the rule-like image of strategy/structure alignment should have endorsed the 
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combination of “high diversification-low control” or “low diversification-high 
control” the legitimate options among business organizations in Taiwan.  
Since the listed firms are frequently the core firms within a business group, the 
impact of external social institutions are not likely to be limited within the listed 
company per se, but rather matters to the whole group. Therefore, business groups 
with publicly listed firms would have to pay more attention to a good fit between 
diversification strategy and an appropriate level of control to satisfy the expectations 
of the financial market than those groups without listed affiliates. 
Hypothesis 5: External financial market would influence the 
diversification/control alignment of business groups. The more publicly 
listed member firms in a business group, the higher the 
diversification/control alignment would be.  
3.3 Power and Politics Account 
Power and politics argument for organizational restructuring focuses on the struggle of 
competing interest and value of key coalitions within an organization. Organizations 
are composed of “competing coalitions with different interests and capabilities for 
influence and adopt structures that bolster their dominant coalition’s power” (Palmer, 
Jennings, and Zhou, 1993). Power and politics theory refers to two dimensions of 
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analysis. While interorganizational level focuses on stakeholders, intraorganizational 
level looks at functional cliques within an organization.  
In this article, the competing interest among major stakeholders is important to 
understand the alignment of business groups. Reed (1999) pointed out that "stakes are 
understood to impose normative obligations….we will define a stake as 'an interest for 
which a valid normative claim can be advanced.'" (p. 467). Similarly, Freeman (1984) 
defined stakeholder as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization's objective” (p. 25). Primary stakeholders are believed 
to have a significant voice on how the business should be organized. Among all 
stakeholders of a business organization, major shareholders are the most influential 
parties who may affect important strategic decisions. Ownership “represents a source 
of power that can be used to either support or oppose management depending on how 
it is concentrated or used” (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980 p. 655). The analysis of 
ownership structure is especially relevant for the study of business groups in Korea and 
Taiwan in the sense that it reflects the social relationship that underpins the group 
capacity (Chang, Chung, and Mahmood, 2004).  
In Taiwan, family and family affiliates, government, foreign MNCs, and institutional 
investors are the four major interest groups. Since family and family affiliates share 
 - 39 -  
common interest and behave similarly in business groups, they are considered as a 
single coalition. I call them insider in this study. 
The relationship between insider ownership and the alignment between diversification 
and control is asymmetric at the two management hierarchies in Taiwan’s business 
groups. At direct level, I propose that insider ownership has no effect or even negative 
effect on diversification/control alignment.  
On the one hand, family and family affiliates would curb the excessive expansion by 
professional managers, who would aim to maximize their own utility. In a typical 
American model of strong managers and weak owners, managers are powered by 
better information and practical decision making autonomy. In Taiwan, business 
groups have long been labeled as family enterprises. Previous research stressed that 
more than 90 per cent of Top 100 groups are owned by families (Hamilton and Kao, 
1990; Chung, 2003). In this sense, business groups are immunized from unnecessary 
expansion to a certain extent. As far as alignment is concerned, it means that the 
strategy and structure of business groups are likely to be organized in a proper way. 
Chung, Mahmood, and Feng (2004) pointed out that family dominance at director level 
added value to business group during institutional transition.  
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On the other hand, in business groups, family tries to steer the entire groups of 
affiliates via a pyramid configuration and cross-shareholding (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). Although increasing need for professional management is 
unavoidable as business groups expand their businesses spectrum and become large 
scale enterprises, family is disinclined to lose control at strategic level (Pugh, et al, 
1968). As mentioned earlier, the key decision-making rights are concentrated within 
the “inner circle” (Chung, 2003). These people take the seats in board of directors in 
business groups. Family tends to view the firms as its own asset, and is averse to trade 
control for efficiency. Previous evidence also shows that director control of business 
groups in Taiwan maintains a very high level throughout the focal two decades in this 
study, which confirms that family members and their associates still tightly control the 
strategic planning.  
Considering the above benefits and cost of insider ownership together, it is not clear 
how it would affect alignment, and I hereby propose competing hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 6a: Insider ownership is positively related with 
diversification /control alignment of business groups at director level.  
Hypothesis 6b: Insider ownership is negatively related with 
diversification /control alignment of business groups at director level.  
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Although different theory suggests different relationship between insider ownership 
and alignment at director level, it is likely that insider domination would add value 
to alignment at manager level. High insider ownership generally guarantees high 
authority concentration at director level, which makes it possible that routine 
management tasks at firm manager level are well configured. When those powerful 
family directors believe that decentralization would benefit the group, they usually 
have the freedom to initiate a reshuffling of positions among existing managers, or 
they can recruit more managers to dilute centralized manager’s control. In turn, 
managers at each affiliated firms do not have strong support to secure their own 
power/interest. Being apart from the strategic and other key decision making, 
neither self-interest oriented business expansion nor strategic accumulation of 
power is likely to happen at manager level. Therefore, I suggest that high insider 
ownership would be beneficial to alignment at manager level. 
Hypothesis 7: Insider ownership is positively related with 
diversification /control alignment of business groups at manager level. 
Among top 100 groups in Taiwan, on average family owned 5.23% of the shares of 
their affiliates and affiliate ownership represented 18.88% in 1998. While insider 
ownership including both family and affiliate may secure substantial control over all 
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member firms, family are not free from the influence of external shareholders, 
especially those blockholders with concentrated ownership. Banks, insurance 
companies, and investment trust firms belong to the institutional block shareholders.  
Agency theory tells us that when stocks are concentrated, large institutional 
shareholder have the incentive and impact to ensure that the corporation is running 
efficiently. Unlike individual investors, institutional investors are able to monitor 
and discipline managers, safeguarding that the long term return are not undermined 
by short term target (Monks and Minow, 1995; Dobrzynski, 1993). This type of 
monitoring can take place either through explicit governance mechanisms, such as 
voting, or through implicit information gathering. The cost of monitoring is 
marginal as comparing to the benefit because the wealth of institutional investors is 
largely associated with the performance of the invested company (Demsetz, 1983). 
Empirical evidence also tells us that institutional ownership has beneficial impact on 
R&D investment, financial performance, policy making, and restructuring of 
business (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1993; Hill and Snell, 1989).  
With regard to business groups in Taiwan, the impact of institutional investor can be 
twofold. First, institutional investor would disapprove the excessive diversification. 
Hamilton (1997) argued that opportunistic diversification was a widespread 
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phenomenon among business groups in Taiwan. Groups extend their existing scale 
or scope of business by setting up new firms in the same or different lines of product. 
As a result, business groups in Taiwan are usually composed of a number of small to 
medium sized affiliates. Institutional investor would help to curb such endeavor 
towards short-term profit maximization. Second, pressure for business group to 
reconstruct comes mainly from the institutional investors. Although family has been 
successful in maintaining its dominance in most business groups by strategically 
dispose their actual share of ownership, there are increasing requests from 
institutional shareholders for a fairer distribution of control. Based on these 
arguments, I suggest that institutional ownership would enhance the fit between 
strategy and structure. 
Hypothesis 8: Institutional ownership is positively related with 
strategy-structure alignment of business groups. The higher portion of 
institutional ownership of business group, the better would be its 
alignment.  
Government and foreign partner are considered to have similar function as local 
institutional shareholders. Government may have even longer term expectations than 
private investors that would include the social welfare and the promotion of 
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innovative business models. Also, foreign partners are more inclined to cooperate 
with those enterprises whose structure is closer to a modern western form. In the 
foreign investors’ perspective, multidivisional structure is a more effective 
configuration than the centralized family control. Therefore, I propose that 
government and foreign ownership benefit the strategy-structure alignment. 
Hypothesis 9: Government ownership is positively related with 
alignment of business groups. The higher portion of government 
ownership of business group, the better would be its alignment.  
Hypothesis 10: Foreign partner’s ownership is positively related with 
alignment of business groups. The higher portion of foreign partner’s 
ownership of business group, the better would be its alignment.  
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CHAPTER IV. DATA, MEASURES, AND ESTIMATION 
1. Sample and Data Sources 
The sample for this study consists of 100 largest groups spanning five time periods, 
from 1981 to 1998. As mentioned earlier, business group is one of the most striking 
organizational features in emerging markets. Business organizations are embedded 
in a social economic environment that favors group formation. The importance of 
business groups in Taiwan warrants me to use them as the basic unit of analysis.  
497 entries for top 100 business groups in 1981, 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998 (only 
97 groups reported the necessary data in 1986) make up the basic structure of my 
panel data. The 18 year period allows me to see the longitudinal trends of the key 
features of Taiwanese business groups. Given that the strategy and structure of 
business groups do not change overnight, a four-year interval is considered 
reasonable.  
Restricting attention to the largest business groups secures access to demographic, 
ownership, and management information in each group, which is necessary to 
calculate other measurements and examine all the theoretical hypotheses in this 
study. In addition, the top 100 camp has considerable significance to the national 
economy in Taiwan. In 1998 the biggest 100 business groups in aggregate employed 
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7298,550 employees and contributed about 54.3 per cent of gross national product 
(GNP). Such economic magnitude grants sufficient generalizability for the sample. 
Although the sampling criterion offers some advantages as noted above, it also 
poses to a common analytical challenge for imbalanced panel. Only 27 groups, out 
of 217 groups that have ever appeared in the dataset, rank top 100 in terms of assets 
throughout all the five periods. The strong imbalance of the panel data may 
undermine findings based on an evolutionary perspective. However, given that the 
major purpose of this study is focused on how the between-group variance would 
affect organizational outcome rather than the specific tracking of organizational 
change, imbalanced panel data should not be a big hazard.  
The directory “Business Groups in Taiwan” (BGT), published by China Credit 
Information Service (CCIS), provides the primary data source for this study. CCIS is 
the oldest and most renowned credit-checking agency in Taiwan and is an affiliate 
of Standard & Poor of the United States. The BGT directory collects demographic 
information on top ranked business groups in Taiwan in terms of assets, sales, 
employees, asset liability, group age, background of top management teams, and 
inter-firm relationship within a group. This directory is so far the most 
comprehensive and reliable source for business groups in Taiwan and has been used 
in previous studies (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988; Hamilton, 1997; Claessens et al., 
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2000; Chung, 2001; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Amsden and Chu, 2003). CCIS 
started publishing data for the top 100 business groups biennially in 1972. However, 
some of the required information is not reported in the directory in its 1970s issues. 
Therefore the data coding for this study commences from 1981. The BGT directory 
in 1982, 1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 (in accordance to the actual information in 
1981, 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1998) provides the majority of basic group information, 
while directories in other years contribute additional information on some control 
variables like lagged group performance. Furthermore, I have referred to other data 
sources such as “The Largest 500 Corporations in Taiwan” and “Taiwan Standard 
Industrial Classification Code” to calculate market concentration and diversification 
measures. 
2. Measures 
2.1  Dependent Variable 
Group performance 
To examine the alignment-performance relationship, I adopted return-on-asset to 
measure group performance. ROA gauges the capability of business group to utilize 
its assets for profit. I also examined a second measure of performance, return-on-
sales (ROS), as robustness check to see whether the results are consistent under the 
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two different variables. Regression results based on ROS are presented in the 
Appendix 3. 
2.2  Independent Variable 
Diversification strategy 
Like their counterparts in other emerging economies (Amsden and Hikino, 1994, 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000), business groups in Taiwan enter new lines of business 
by establishing new firms (Hamilton and Kao, 1990). Such arrangement enables 
new ventures to access group level resources, while it buffers unpredictable risk 
from unfamiliar industry. One outcome of this growth pattern is high diversification 
at the group level but low or no diversification at the firm level. Following Khanna 
and Palepu (2000) and Chung, Mahmood, and Feng (2004), I constructed group 
level diversification according to the product information of each member firm.  
Group diversification is calculated by entropy (Palepu, 1985). Suppose a group 
operates in n industry segments.  If Pi is the share of the ith segment in the total 
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Unlike most company data in U.S., there is no existing industry code system in the 
BGT directory. I therefore had to manually assign an SIC code to each of the 
member firms affiliated to business group. The Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) published by Taiwanese government in 1996 provides the coding guideline. It 
has 11 1-digit industries, 66 2-digit industries and 229 3-digit industries. Entropy 
index was calculated from 2-digit SIC codes. Group level entropy was obtained by 
aggregating sales in each industry at group level after firm level sales information is 
gathered. 
Inter-organizational control 
The Herfindahl Index (Herfindahl, 1950; Berry, 1975) is adopted to measure 
coordination and control of business groups. This structure measure is different from 
the four-category typology developed by the Harvard group (Channon, 1973; 
Rumelt, 1974), which makes little sense to capture the structural variance for 
business groups in Taiwan. Initially, Herfindahl is devised in industrial economics to 
gauge the market concentration. It takes into consideration the number of firms in a 
market as well as the relative size of each firm. This index is calculated by squaring 
the market share of each firm in a market and then summing the squares, as follows: 








2)( , where MSi represents the market share of firm i 
and totally there are n firms in the market.  
The same concept can be transplanted to business groups, where the entire group can 
be analogized as the whole market and each administrative position as the firm. In 
this case, Herfindahl index tells us how businesses are clustered around the key 
administrative positions. Two different Herfindahl indexes are developed to fit the 
duplicate hierarchy, one for the director control and the other for manager control. 
The square of the proportion of group sales are aggregated for all managers and 
directors within a group, thus capturing how centralized the business (in terms of 
sales) is under control of these people. Steps Herfindahl calculation for “Manager 
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2)( , where GSDi represents the group 
share of the sum of sales of all member firms under the control of 
director i. 
Table 3 gives more detail on how the Herfindahl Index is developed. The index 
ranges between 0 and 1, with 1 indicates the most centralized control and 0 the least. 
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As can be seen in Table 4, when there is only one manager in the group who 
controls all group sales the index is equal to 1, which is an extreme case of very high 
authority concentration in the organizational hierarchy. In contrast, if there are five 
managers and each of them controls 20% of the group sales, the Herfindahl index 
takes a value of 0.2, which manifests a decentralized control. 
[Table 3 about here] 
It is noteworthy that there are cases where one person can simultaneously take 
multiple positions across the two hierarchies. In those cases, most frequently one 
person assumes both director and general manager of a member firm. Although such 
cases are not rare among the entire sample, fortunately it would not alter the control 
landscape of the organization that I intend to examine. The relative relationship 
between the director/manager and other director/manager remains unchanged 
because the Herfindahl index is calculated separately at the two layers of 
organizational hierarchy.  
Alignment of diversification and control 
To tackle the issue of alignment between diversification and coordination/control, I 
adopt a new measure, “alignment”, following Chung, Mahmood, and Feng’s (2004) 
earlier endeavor. It aims to estimate the level of fit between diversification strategy 
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and concentration of control in business groups. The alignment measure is designed 
to gauge the closeness that the relationship between strategy and structure 
approaches the optimal fit suggested by Chandler. Low alignment means that the 
strategy/control relationship is far away from the optimal condition, whereas high 
alignment indicates a good match. 
The idea of alignment is underpinned by Chandler’s argument that the best fit 
between strategy and structure exists in two ideal types: highly diversified groups 
with decentralized control, and more focused groups with centralized control. In the 
following, I used entropy and Herfindahl Index at the director level (DirH) to 
illustrate how to calculate alignment. The calculation involves three steps: 
(1) Normalize diversification and control measures,  
)DT(Min)DT(Max
)DT(MiniDT)iDT(N −
−= , where DTi represents the total diversification for the 
ith group, Min(DT) means the minimal value of DT for the whole sample (n), 
and Max(DT) is the maximal value of DT. 
)DirH(Min)DirH(Max
)DirH(MiniDirH)iDirH(N −
−= , where DirHi means the director control centrality 
for the ith group, Min(DirH) means the minimal value of DirH for the whole 
sample (n), and Max(DirH) is the maximal value of DirH. 
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(2) Define the best fit, 
The assumption of fit between normalized measure of diversification and control 
is a perfect negative relationship, which satisfies the function: 
1=+DirHDT In this case, any sum of DTi and DirHi not equal to one is considered 
different from the optimal fit. 
(3) Alignment is formulated as follows: 
11 −+−= iDirHiDTiD , where Di represents the value of alignment of ith group. 
Table 4 illustrates the measure of alignment by four extreme conditions. Take 
condition ‘A’ as an example, with a value of 1 in entropy indicates a very high level 
of diversification, and a 0 in control means a greatly decentralized organization. 
Using this formula, the alignment value turns out to be 1, which means a very good 
fit between strategy and structure. In other words, the higher the alignment, the 
better fit between diversification and control.  
[Table 4 about here] 
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Market Concentration 
Market competition is measured by the four-firm concentration ratio, defined at the 
2-Digit SIC level. Kamien and Schwartz (1982) pointed out that firms possessed 
more monopoly power in more concentrated industry than those in less aggregated 
industries. Previous research of industrial organization has found a positive linkage 
between industry concentration and firm profit (Demsetz, 1973; Amato & Wilder, 
1988). The directory “The Largest 500 Corporations in Taiwan” listed all the firms, 
whose annual sales exceeded one million Taiwan dollars, in 56 industries. The 
industry sales are calculated by adding sales of all the firms in one industry, and the 
industry concentration is the percentage of the sales aggregate of the biggest four 
firms. Once the industry level information is available, market concentration at 
group level takes the average of industry concentration for all the industries the 
group operates, weighted by sales in each industry. While the 56 industries shown in 
“The Largest 500 Corporations in Taiwan” are not completely the same as the 89 2-
Digit SICs as defined by “Taiwan Standard Industrial Classification Code”, the 
group level concentration ratio would thus only reflect the structure of those 
industries covered by the data source.  
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Number of Listed Firms 
The number of member firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange Market implies the 
extent to which the decision making is subject to the expectations of financial 
market. It is notable that financial market in Taiwan is not well established till the 
late 1990s. Previous research has also acknowledged that the financial market in 
Taiwan makes no more than marginal contribution to the bloom of private business 
(Hamilton, 1996). Given the underdevelopment of the market in the focal period of 
this study, it would still be interesting to see how much this institutional factor 
matters to the strategic and structure configuration of those business groups with 
publicly listed members. 
Ownership 
The directory “Business Groups in Taiwan” provides the information on major 
shareholders for most member firms associated with a business group. First, I coded 
the ownership in six shareholder categories for each member firm: family, affiliate, 
institutional investor, foreign investor, government, and others. The coding scheme 
for group ownership is shown in Appendix 2. The value of ownership is in 
percentage, ranging from 0 to 100 per cent. Ownership at group level is simply the 
aggregate of the information from firm level. First, I calculate the subtotal of each 
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shareholder category at group level by summing up the capital value of assets under 
the control of that category in each member firm. Second, I divide the subtotal by 
the total group assets to get the percentage of ownership for each category. For 
instance, suppose that a business group consist of only two member firms: A and B, 
and firm A has 1000 assets while firm B has 2000. For firm A, assume that family 
owns 80% of its shares, and a foreign company owns the remaining 20%. Also 
assume that 50% of firm B is owned by the family, and the other half is owned by a 
local bank. Under this condition, the business group has three kinds of owners: 
family, foreign investor, and institutional investor, each of which occupies 60%, 
6.67%, and 33.33% of the group.  
It is worthy of mentioning that due to the missing ownership information of some 
member firms in a group, the percentage of each shareholder category may not sum 
to 1.  
I combine the family and affiliate ownership into insider ownership in this thesis 
because family and its affiliates share similar interest and value. It is better to treat 
them as a single coalition in the power and politics landscape in an organization. 
However, I have also run the analysis for each of them separately. My confidence of 
such disposition is enhanced due to the consistent results obtained.  
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2.3 Control Variables 
A measure of group size is included to test whether or not there are inherent 
advantages associated with size. Large enterprises, it is often argued, benefit from 
economy of scale and scope, maintain easier access to capital, and enjoy higher 
status in the market than their smaller counterparts. Opposite arguments from 
organizational ecology, however, suggest that large business enterprises suffer from 
structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1976), which is especially harmful in an 
unstable environment. “Forces of organizational inertia can prevent an alteration in a 
firm’s course of action and limit the prospects for growth” (Fligstein, 1990). While 
no organization is free from structural inertia, the fossilization of routines and rules 
that adds to inertia intensifies as the size and age of organization increase. In this 
thesis, size is measured by the sum of annual sales of all member firms within a 
group. It is then adjusted by the 1996 consumer price index in Taiwan to make cross 
year comparison meaningful.  
I have also controlled for group age, liability/assets ratio, and industry dummies in 
the regression models. Group age is another indicator of structural inertia, and it 
would delay any strategic or structural adjustment in business groups. However, 
seniority would also mean richer external connections and higher risk buffering 
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capacity in emerging context. Liability/asset ratio suggests the financing ability of 
the group. Twelve Industry dummies are included in regression models to control 
for unobserved differences rooted in the idiosyncratic features of each industry. The 
12 categories are agriculture, food, textile, wood, chemical, nonmetallic manufacture, 
metal, machinery, electronics, construction, retail, finance, and service industries. 
3. Description of the Data 
The means, standard deviation, and correlations among all the primary variables in 
pooled sample are presented in Table 5, and the trend of change for those variables 
is shown in Table 6 in chronicle structure.  
Generally, the presence of the correlations of 0.90 or above is a first indication of 
substantial collinearity (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1998). Inspection of the 
correlations matrix of the independent variables reveals that the correlation between 
each pair of variables seldom exceeds 0.4, indicating that there is no 
multicollinearity problem that would undermine the estimation. The correlation 
between two measures of dependent variables is 0.75, significant at 0.01 confidence 
level. It implies that regressions based on either ROA or ROS would generate 
consistent results, which is confirmed by the regression models presented in later 
section.   
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Complementary to Table 5, Table 6 provides the information on how strategy, 
structure, and other organizational features of business groups in Taiwan change in 
the focal period of study. ROA and ROS of top100 business groups do not show any 
obvious trend over the years, however, I do find a clear pattern of increasing 
variance of the two performance measures. This finding is consistent with the 
general view that development of market leads to greater disparity between winners 
and losers. 
Concerning total diversification, Table 6 indicates that top 100 business groups are 
inclined to adopt product diversification strategy. Results from t-statistics 
demonstrate that total diversification in 1990s is significantly higher than that of 
1980s. It suggests that during the past two decades, groups keep on investing in 
different business portfolios to expand the business scope. In general, this result 
confirms the previous research on Taiwanese business groups (Hamilton, 1990, 
1997; Wong, 1985), which has noted that groups would like to construct vertically 
integrated firms as the core and several firms in completely unrelated areas. 
Reflected in the data, this strategic behavior of Taiwanese business groups leads to 
an overall high level of diversification, continuously increasing over time.  
If Chandler were correct, I would expect a drop in both director control and manager 
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control as a response to the increasing diversification. Statistic summary in Table 6 
generally supports the arguments. Concentration in coordination and control of 
business groups remains comparatively stable in the late 1970s and 1980s, while it 
decreases steadily in 1990s. Overall, director control and manager control manifest a 
steady process towards decentralization. Combing diversification and control, it 
seems that the current finding favors Chandler’s general predication, while Kock 
and Guillen’s (2001) model does not fit the direction of the move. Theoretically, the 
basic assumption of Kock and Guillen’s model: market imperfection and 
trade/investment protectionism, better mirrors the actual business environment in 
Taiwan than Chandler’s theory. However, Chandler’s argument receives stronger 
support from current evidence, indicating its high generalizability. The potential 
reason on why Kock and Guillen’s model does not hold is given in greater detail in 
discussion section. In addition, the negative correlation between diversification and 
organizational control at duplicate hierarchies further confirms that previous wisdom 
on how strategy and structure should be organized still holds in Taiwan. This finding 
also adds to my confidence that the notion of alignment, which is designed to 
capture the interface between diversification and control, makes sense. 
Table 6 presents the trend of alignment at director and manager level. It shows that 
alignment remains rather stable over time at a moderately high level. Moreover, 
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inter-group variation in alignment is not apparent, which suggests that most groups 
in Taiwan combine their strategy and structure in an appropriate spectrum. 
Information in alignment is quite consistent with the joint movement between 
diversification and control over time, which implies reliability for both measures. 
When it comes to ownership structure of business groups in Taiwan, result in Table 
6 shows that family and family affiliate firmly occupy the position of dominant 
shareholder, despite a decreasing pattern in the late 1990s. Local institutional 
investors and foreign investors make the second and third largest block holders in 
business group, whereas the governmental share is marginal as compared to the 
other three ownership types. The dominant status of family warrants it considerable 
freedom to configure business groups orbiting its own interest. 
4. Model Specification and Estimation 
4.1 Model specification 
In this study of business groups in Taiwan, the outcome and antecedents of 
diversification/control alignment are primary concerns.  
The effect of alignment is addressed in terms of the group’s financial performance, 
and the profit model used to tackle this issue can be written as: 













The ROA in previous two year, group age, size, leverage ratio, and market power, 
industry, and total diversification are control variables in this model, whereas 
alignment at the director level and the manager level are main effects. 
In order to examine whether the effect of alignment varies with the development of 
market institutions as addressed by Hypothesis 2, the whole sample was split into 
two parts: 1981 to 1990 and 1994 to 1998. The concept of market institutions is so 
implicit that it is difficult to develop a specific measure for it in this study. Therefore 
the sub-sample approach becomes the optimal solution. Such division is based on 
the institutional transition in Taiwan during late 1980s and early 1990s. It is shown 
from Appendix 1 that the marketization indicator in product market, financial market, 
and labor market all increased dramatically from pre 1990 to post 1990 periods. To 
categorize 1990 into the first period involves some arbitrary decision in that it is 
right in the transition period. However, there are two facts that would favor such a 
division. First, although the institution transition in Taiwan began around the mid 
1980s, its political democratization preceded the economic liberalization. The wave 
of economic deregulations actually started in late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, 
the effect of economic transformation usually lags the effect of political reform. It 
would take several years for the effect of economic deregulations to show the full 
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impact. It is especially the case when we are to discuss the strategy and structure 
change, which also needs time to implement the in organizations.   
There is a four year lag between dependent variables and independent variables 
when it comes to investigate the antecedents of diversification/control alignment. 
Similar to organizational strategy and structure, alignment can hardly change 
overnight. The nature of alignment makes it meaningless to use the current situation 
in efficiency, institutional, and politics account to explain the variance in 
contemporaneous alignment. The regression models for antecedents of alignment, 















As the data contains both cross-sectional and longitudinal information, fixed effects 
cross-sectional time series models are employed to accommodate unobserved 
heterogeneity. Fixed effects estimation has apparent advantages over random effects 
in this study for two reasons. First, the sample does not come from the random 
selection procedures, where random effects model is more suitable to make 
“unconditional or marginal inference with respect to the population of all effects” 
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(Hsiao, 2002: 43). How individual differences among the sample affect the 
alignment and performance is the focus of this study. Second, one fundamental 
benefit of fixed effects inference is that it does not rely on the assumption that 
individual effects are independent of explanatory variables. Hsiao (2002) suggests 
that if individual effects are correlated with explanatory variables, one should 
choose fixed-effects, otherwise random effects are preferred.  We performed the 
Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) to see whether important individual effects iα  are 
correlated with the right-hand variables  for all the regression models. The null 
hypothesis for each model gets rejected at 0.01 level. Such result provides strong 
indication of misspecification for random-effects models. 
ix
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CHAPTER V. RESULTS 
1. The Link between Alignment and Performance 
Table 7 reports the linkage between diversification/control alignment and group 
performance from 1981 to 1998. Model 1 shows the effect of all the control 
variables, which consist of ROA in the previous two years, group age, size in terms 
of annual sales, liability/assets ratio, market concentration ratio, and 12 industry 
dummies (coefficients for the 12 dummy variables are omitted in the table). Group 
sales and market concentration is positive to ROA, whereas total diversification is 
significantly negative. Moreover, group ROA two years ago no longer had any 
strong impact on the current performance, which indicated that profitability 
persistence was not high in the focal period among top 100 business groups. This 
pattern may reflect the export oriented nature of Taiwan’s economy at macro level.  
Model 2 examines the effect of alignment at both director and manager levels on 
group performance. It is shown that the alignment is not always beneficial to 
performance: only alignment at manager level adds value to group ROA, while 
alignment at director level is moderately negative or have no effect. Such finding is 
by and large consistent with hypothesis 3, but somehow contradicts with Chandler’s 
implications that alignment at strategic level (similar to headquarter in 
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multidivisional firms) is important.  
[Table 7 about here] 
In order to test hypothesis 2, the effect of market improvement on the relationship 
between alignment and performance, I divided the sample into two periods: 1981 to 
1990 and 1994 to 1998. Before the late 1980s, the Kuomintang (KMT, the 
Nationalist Party) dominated Taiwan’s politics and economy (Amsden, 1985). KMT 
lost the civil war in mainland China and become an imposed authority in Taiwan, 
who retains much character of a military authority. The private businesses are not 
encouraged in the sense that local capitalists are considered as potential threat to the 
dominance of the airborne regime. In line with such political atmosphere, most 
financial industries, public utilities and transportation, and other key manufacturing 
sectors were tightly regulated by the government (Wade, 1990). Such situation 
remained rarely changed until the late 1980s under both external and internal 
pressures. A notable milestone is the elimination of the martial laws in 1987. Within 
a few years, not only were more open administrative policies initiated, but more 
liberal additions and amendments to the legal framework were inaugurated (Chung, 
Mahmood, and Feng, 2004). The process of political democratization facilitated the 
market liberalization. Those industry sectors previously regulated by the government 
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began to open to private and foreign investors and competitions are cultivated in the 
market. Detailed change of the market over the transition period is shown in 
Appendix 1. It is noteworthy that all indicators of market have improved 
significantly during 1990-1998. 
Model 3 and Model 4 present the results for each of the 1981-1990 and 1994-1998 
periods respectively. The market power-performance association is much stronger in 
the second period than that of the first. This finding provides additional clue that 
there is considerable difference in market conditions before and after 1990. Similarly, 
the negative effect of diversification on ROA is higher in Model 4 than in Model 3. 
When it comes to the main effects, at director level the alignment manifests only 
tangential negative impact to profitability, which does not vary much in the two 
periods. At manager level, Model 3 and Model 4 jointly lend strong support to 
hypothesis 2. The coefficient of alignment at manager level is significantly positive 
in the 1980s, and it increases dramatically in the 1990s, both are significant at 0.05 
level.  
This result is in line with the theoretical predictions. In the 1980s, the benefits of 
good fit between diversification and control may be suppressed by other unobserved 
factors in the premature market mechanisms, yet such benefit emerges in the 1990s 
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as market institutions develop. In addition to the increased magnitude in the 
coefficient, alignment, together with control variables, accounts for 63 per cent of 
the ROA variation in the second period. This is about three times the size that the 
model can explain during the 1980s. The notable increase in R-square in the second 
period tells that the relative magnitude of alignment and other regressors in the 
model becomes much higher as compared to those unobserved factors, which 
dominate the first period. This finding also suggests that the positive effect of 
alignment at manager level in the focal two decades is actually driven by the second 
period. The impact of alignment is thus conditional on the situation of market 
mechanism.  
It is worthy of mentioning that to control for the past profitability and market 
concentration ratio leads to the loss of observations in the regression model. There 
should be 497 observations in total from 1981 to 1998. However, not all the top 100 
groups have enough information to calculate the market concentration aggregated at 
group level. Moreover, business groups belong to top 100 currently may not 
necessarily belong to the top 100 camp two years earlier. To control for past 
profitability thus eliminates even more observations. I have used t-statistics to 
examine if there is systematic difference between the 104 dropped groups and those 
are included in the regression model. Results indicate that the two samples are not 
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significantly different at 0.05 level among the main variables like strategy, structure, 
performance, and ownership structure. I have also run the regression without market 
concentration ratio and past performance for the 104 dropped groups. The estimated 
coefficients for alignment are consistent with the ones shown in Table 7, although 
the significant level varies. In this case, current regression results from Table 7 are 
not systematically biased due to the missing observations.  
Model 1 through Model 4 got re-tested after the left-hand variable was replaced with 
ROS. New results are shown in Appendix 3. The findings are very consistent with 
existing results when ROA works as the dependent variable, not only in terms of the 
sign and the magnitude of the coefficient, but the significance level of each 
explanatory variable. A chi-square test revealed strong joint significance (p<.001) 
for all the model specifications reported in Table 7 and Appendix 3.  
2. Antecedents of Alignment 
Table 8 and Table 9 present the regression models for the antecedents of alignment 
at manager level and director level respectively. As shown by Table 7 and Appendix 
3, alignment at manager level adds value to ROA. Therefore, the question how some 
business groups can achieve such alignment while others fail to do so becomes an 
intriguing issue with theoretical and practical importance. In comparison, no positive 
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effect persists for alignment at director hierarchy, at least in the focal period from 
early 1980s to late 1990s in Taiwan. The absence of positive effect may attribute to 
the unique social economic relationships like family domination, organizational 
history, and other contextual effects as introduced in earlier sections. While it seems 
that the alignment at director level does not have any direct practical value, it is 
nevertheless interesting to see the specific difference in the effect of efficiency, 
institutional, and politics perspectives on alignment between two managerial 
hierarchies in business group.  
[Table 8 about here] 
[Table 9 about here] 
Alignment, defined as the interface between diversification strategy and 
organizational control, may not be immune from constraint to organizational change. 
Since conventional wisdom suggests that age and size of an organization provide the 
primary source of structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), they are included 
in regression model to accommodate the inertia in formal structure that ultimately 
affects alignment. Liability/asset ratio reflects the foot toe of banks, which would 
also prevent business enterprises to adopt decentralized structure (Palmer, Friedland, 
Jennings, and Powers, 1987). In this case, group age, size, liability/assets ratio, 
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industry dummies, and current alignment are control variables in the base line model 
in Table 8 and Table 9, where alignment at t4 is the dependent variable. There is a 
four-year lag between explanatory and dependent variables. 
2.1 Alignment at manager level 
In accordance with hypothesis 4, Model 2 in Table 8 shows that market 
concentration is negatively associated with alignment at manager level. It implies 
that business groups operating in more competitive industries are more subject to the 
efficiency pressures. As a consequence, those groups are keen to achieve the fit 
between strategy and structure. In addition, the obvious R-square increase also 
suggests that the efficiency account is an important dimension that explains the 
variance in alignment.  
The lagged alignment and missing information in market concentration for certain 
groups together lead to a loss of 105 observations in Model 2, which proposes the 
possibility that the significant effect of market competition might be caused by the 
data screening effect from missing values. To tackle this potential threat to the 
current inference, I used t-statistic to compare both the dependent variables and 
independent variables in the regression model between the lost 105 cases and those 
retains in Model 2. The outcome indicates that there is no systematic difference 
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between the two samples. In addition, regression of control variables on manager 
level alignment based on the sub sample of 248 observations produces similar result 
as that in Model 1. Such robustness check enhances the reliability of the current 
analytical results. 
Financial market, unlike the product market, does not exert sufficient influence on 
alignment. In Model 3, the number of listed firms in business group does not 
manifest any significant impact on the alignment at manager level. Such a result 
suggests that there may not be clear patterns between institutional forces coming 
from capital market and the goodness of fit in strategy/structure. The limited role of 
stock market may imply that capital market in Taiwan in general has only moderate 
impact on group strategy and structure. Business group has been well recognized as 
a primary source of funding for member firms, and such internal capital market 
would buffer the impact from external market. The detachment between capital 
market and group alignment may also indicate that the institutional approach has 
comparatively weak explanatory power concerning the issue of organizational 
configuration vis a vis efficiency accounts. The discussion part of this article will 
present the explanations in greater detail. 
The regression results for power and politics account are listed in Model 4 of Table 8. 
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Ownership of foreign investors enhances the diversification/control alignment at 
manager level. In contrast, insiders (family members and affiliates), government, 
and local institutional investor have at most marginal influence. Hypothesis 7 
suggests that insider ownership would add value to alignment at manager level in 
that the authority of family, usually backed by family share and the pattern of 
interfirm control, in business groups warrants that routine management tasks at firm 
manager level are well organized. If family has the freedom to initiate a reshuffling 
of positions among existing managers, and if the fit between strategy and structure is 
among the prior interests of the family, high alignment at manager level can be 
achieved. Surprisingly, such proposition is not supported. A careful scrutiny along 
this line of reasoning reveals that it is open to doubt: (a) whether high insider share 
is an accurate indicator of family authority, and (b) whether diversification/control 
alignment is among highest administrative priority. As introduced earlier, the power 
of family can be amplified through interlocking shareholding among member firms. 
Such amplification effect varies for different groups and it spreads to every 
hierarchy of the organization in both explicit and implicit way. The differences are 
so subtle that it can hardly be gauged by the ownership structure alone. Moreover, 
the importance of alignment may be surpassed by other considerations like family 
dominance, succession, and stability, which are believed to be of central importance 
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to Chinese family business. 
A comprehensive model is presented in the last column in Table 8, which shows the 
overall effect of efficiency and legitimating, and power and politics matters on the 
alignment at manager level. These three accounts altogether explains 37 per cent of 
the variance for manager level alignment among groups, which is more than twice 
that is accounted for by the base line model. Model 5 in Table 8 indicates that the 
model for alignment at manager level is meaningfully specified. 
2.2 Alignment at director level 
Table 9 presents regression models for antecedents of director level alignment. The 
control variables, and the efficiency, institutional, and political perspectives do not 
give any clear clue on how such alignment is determined. None of the three 
perspectives, neither their respective individual effect as shown in Model 2 through 
Model 4, nor the overall effect, shown in Model 5, is sufficient to explain the 
difference in alignment at the director level. As compared to the corresponding 
models in Table 8, the R-square of each model specification in Table 9 is 
systematically lower. An F-test for each model in Table 9 reveals that the joint effect 
of all the explanatory variables does not significantly higher than nil. Altogether, 
regression results from Table 9 suggest that the diversification/control alignment at 
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the strategic level in business groups may not rely on efficiency, institutional, and 
internal politic forces, although such forces have successfully explained the 
alignment at manager level. The current empirical outcome implies that the 
antecedents of the interface beteen diversification and control at director level 
remain largely unknown. 
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CHAPTER VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study aims to investigate whether Chandler’s theory on strategy/structure 
alignment holds for business groups in Taiwan. Chandler’s research implies that a 
good fit between strategy and structure benefits performance. While scholars that 
followed Chandler have focused their attention on the mature market, this study 
offers some insights in emerging economy. This thesis also tries to identify the 
antecedents for the alignment, which is a relatively novel area that previous 
literature has not fully explored.  
Duplicate hierarchy is an interesting feature among business groups in Taiwan, 
which distinguishes them from their counterparts in Korea, Japan, and western 
multidivisional firms. The results show that at manager level, diversification/control 
alignment adds value to the financial performance of the business group only after 
market institutions have developed. Product market, financial market, and 
stakeholders’ power more or less determine the degree of alignment. Such finding is 
broadly consistent with what the hypotheses in this thesis have predicted. At the 
director level, in contrast, neither does alignment contribute to performance, nor can 
it be explained by efficiency, institutional, and power and politics perspectives.  
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The theoretical implications, limitations, and space for future research are discussed 
below.  
1. Findings and implications 
1.1 Chandler’s theoretical scope and market institutions 
The first major finding in this article is that Chandler’s prediction regarding the 
optimal organizational fit does not hold when the market is underdeveloped, which 
means that the benefit of alignment is conditional on market institutions. Moreover, 
while the positive effect of alignment emerges at the manager level as market 
develops, similar effect does not manifest at the director level. The discrepancy 
between Chandler’s argument and the empirical evidence may ascribe to the fact 
that there are many other intervening factors, which also matter to group 
performance. This study contradicts previous findings that Chandler’s theory has a 
wide theoretical scope and is free from context.  
Underdeveloped market institutions have multilateral impacts on strategy and 
structure of Taiwanese business groups, and it moderates the association between 
alignment and performance. Business groups have been widely conceptualized as a 
reasonable response to the market failure in emerging economies. As an alternative 
to external market, groups would economize transaction cost stemming from 
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unequal information and potential conflict of interest between buyers and sellers. 
Once business groups shoulder part of the responsibility that should have been 
assumed by the market, the incentive left in the external market for organizations to 
pursue sound strategy and proper structure can easily be outweighed by other 
considerations. Those responsibilities include internal product market like vertical 
integration and internal capital market like mutual investment among member firms.  
In addition, once groups internalize the market mechanisms, they may stand in the 
way of the attempts to cultivate the market institutions. As Khanna and Palepu (1999) 
reminded “any initiative to develop emerging economies must acknowledge that the 
business groups themselves may want to maintain the status quo”.  
While the benefit of alignment at manager level emerges during 1990s in this study, 
it is not clear why alignment at director level does not add value. The board of 
directors, mostly likely to be members in the “inner circle”, controls the power of 
strategic decision making. It seems that the configuration at this level is immune 
from all the efficiency, institutional, and political forces. Chung, Mahmood, and 
Feng (2004) also found no clear pattern of alignment at the director level, and they 
attributed such effect to the unique combination of strategic control and a 
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transitional context. The decision-making process and the subsequent organizational 
dynamics within the “inner circle” is still by and large a “black box”.   
When it comes to the direction of strategic and structural trends of business groups, 
empirical evidence confirms Chandler’s general prediction of increasing 
diversification and greater decentralization. Kock and Guillen’s (2001) model does 
not hold. I suggest that backwardness of market institutions and family dominance 
can offer useful lens to enhance our understanding towards the current picture on 
strategy and structure. These two factors are central to the formation of strategy and 
structure during the rapid industrialization of Taiwan.  
The unfledged financial market in Taiwan remains a striking contrast to its overall 
economic advancement. Probably due to a tradition of detachment between the state 
and private firms in Taiwan, formal financial system did not play an active role in 
private business. At the initial governance of Kuo Ming Tang (KMT) authority in 
Taiwan, the government deliberately restrains the growth of private businesses and 
the emergence of powerful capitalists for the sake of social simplicity and stability. 
Since financial resources can hardly be obtained from banks or government loans, 
most business groups rely on internal capital for their investment and operation. 
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Such detachment thereafter in turn reinforces underdevelopment of formal financial 
market in Taiwan.  
In terms of diversification strategy, a direct consequence of the backwardness of 
financial market means the lack of “exit” channel from existing product lines. 
Where financial system works efficiently, say U.S. and Western Europe, firms can 
rely on acquisition, merger, and divestment to restructure their business sphere 
where necessary. Less severe information asymmetry, reliable supervision from 
Security and Exchange Commission, and sound regulation by government can 
minimize risk for potential buyers and sellers in the market. Investment banks and 
market intermediaries make the transactions even more active. However, immaturity 
of market institutions, especially in financial market, is almost always a problem in 
emerging economy. Once a business group enters a new industry, it would be costly 
to split the new business off from the entire organization. In the first place, there 
were no institutional buyers in the market, and business groups seldom make such 
decision to buy a firm from others. In the second place, the inter-firm business links 
and investment links are pervasive among member firms within a group; sometimes 
even profit can be transferred to manipulate a nice-looking accounting report, which 
makes the task of pricing group-affiliated firms prohibiting. As a consequence, the 
lack of quit mechanism in underdeveloped financial market makes business groups 
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less likely to divest existing product lines even if economic benefit is expected. 
When opportunities continuously open up, more product lines will be added to the 
existing business portfolio, and increasing diversification becomes certain. Given 
the high diversification accumulated by business groups in the history, the balance 
between diversification and control as advocated by Chandler can only be achieved 
by decentralization to improve the coordination, control, and strategic planning of 
heterogeneous operation.  
If such process is relatively smooth at the manager level, the family dominance 
would make such decentralization difficult at the director level. The incentive to 
decentralize management authority is probably smaller than the motivation to retain 
power and influence of family. I did find that some business groups close their 
businesses in declining industries or unprofitable units. However, such practice is 
uncommon even in the late 1990s. 
Although existing empirical evidence does not support Kock and Guillen’s model, in 
the long run, however, their argument may still be relevant. When market forces 
become strong enough, it revises previous inefficient strategies and/or inappropriate 
structures. However, at least in the short run, it is not guaranteed that market 
institutions would follow on the pace of economic growth. While economic growth 
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is driven primarily by spontaneous organizational dynamics, the establishment of 
efficient market infrastructure is much more effort-taking, and accordingly, requires 
more patience. Moreover, the co-evolution between environment and organization 
may not strictly follow the rule of economic efficiency. International politics, culture, 
history, state regulation at macro level, and path dependence and inertia at micro 
level are all mixed in the story. Whitley’s (1999) argument of “systemness” recalls 
that differences in social economic conditions contribute to the divergence of 
capitalism. 
1.2 Antecedents of alignment 
This study finds that economic account, institutional account, and power and politics 
account to a certain degree jointly determine the interaction between diversification 
and structural centralization at the manager level, while determinants to alignment at 
the director level remain to be seen.    
First, the fit between strategy and structure at the manager level is subject to the 
influence of market concentration. Competition is supposed to be less intense in 
concentrated industries where companies can live with a misfit between strategy and 
structure in concentrated markets. In contrast, cut-throat competition exerts more 
incentive and pressure for companies to configure their strategy and structure 
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carefully and properly. The rationale of economic account pertaining to the issue of 
diversification/control alignment is indeed supported by this study.   
Second, institutional approach does not appear as powerful as economic approach to 
explain the variance of the manager level alignment among business groups in 
Taiwan. Listed member firms within a group bring no more than tangential pressure 
to improve the fit between diversification and control. Several factors would provide 
tentative explanation to the absence of a positive effect from the legitimation 
constraints: 
a. The mechanism through which affiliated member firms affects the overall 
strategic and structural arrangement of at group level is not straightforward. 
Even if there were legitimacy concerns from the financial market, such 
pressure might be insulated at firm level. It is not necessary that investors 
make a purchase upon evaluating the organizational configurations to for the 
whole group where information is not as available and reliable as those of 
listed firms. In this case, the group perceives no immediate necessity to 
worry about how the market expects its strategy and structure.  
b. Financial market in Taiwan is unfledged as compared to the western capital 
system, and it is less developed than the product market in Taiwan. A brief 
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retrospection to the development history shows that formal capital market 
and bank system in Taiwan did not play an active role to nurture the vitality 
in private business sector. In Taiwan, informal way of finance from family, 
friends, and personal associates, which are backed by interpersonal trust, 
pervade in private businesses. A majority of entrepreneurs prefer such 
investment source because it offers flexibility and quick accessibility when 
opportunity emerges. The so-called “curb market” contributed 30% of total 
capital in manufacturing investment (Hamilton, 1997). Whitley (1994, 1999) 
recommended that the extent to which capital remains private or owned by 
the state, and to which additional capital is supplied by liberal financial 
market or via partnered banks, are central in determining prevailing 
organizational strategies within the context. The shortage of powerful market 
institutions, trusted credit checking intermediaries, and active commercial 
banking system during the course of Taiwan’s industrialization would have 
weakened the power of legitimation. Legitimation, as a taken-for-granted 
social norm, is not given. It is by and large sustained by social institutions. 
Without powerful social institutions, the impact of the legitimacy of certain 
form or practice will substantially discounted.  
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c. In the third place, the “right way” which business groups should follow to 
achieve sustainable growth are still under debate. Although a number of 
strategic and organizational researchers (Khanna and Palepu, 1999, Carrera, 
Mesquita, Perkins, and Vassolo, 2003) offer preliminary insights on how to 
restructure business groups, there is no ready consensus for practitioners to 
follow. The legitimacy for good alignment as suggested by Chandler may not 
be strong among emerging markets, and such legitimacy force would 
especially be weak during the 1980s and 1990s, when the Asian economic 
miracle is at its florescence. During the focal two decades, seldom did any 
research attack the heterogeneous diversification and high family control, 
which are so popular among business groups in Taiwan. In this sense, what 
seems to be operating in Asia at that time is a special local set of social 
norms which is largely different from western management norms. Taking 
the above considerations into account, it is not surprising that institutional 
factors appear to be foreign to alignment. 
d. Finally, although financial markets did not show direct effect on 
diversification/control alignment, the effect may have been absorbed by 
institutions, government and foreign investors. The penalty of illegitimacy 
would take multiple forms. For financial market, the cost of illegitimacy can 
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be reflected in discounted stock price (Zuckerman, 1999), whereas in product 
market, the illegitimacy would depress demand (Carroll and Swaminathan, 
2000) and discourage foreign investment. The lack of effect of financial 
market on organizational alignment does not necessarily mean that 
legitimacy is a trivial issue. How the institutions, government, and foreign 
investors interact with financial market, and how they together set 
constraints on corporate strategy and structure deserve future research. 
Third, while foreign partners do have impact on alignment, the relationship between 
alignment and family ownership, institutional ownership, and government 
ownership remains obscure. Without doubt, family remains the most powerful 
coalition among all the major stakeholders for the majority of business groups in 
Taiwan. Family has long been labeled as conservative and risk averse in nature. 
Chung, Mahmood, and Feng (2004) attribute such conservatism of family managers 
to the fact that “their personal fortune are closely tied to the long-term interests of 
the family business; and their main goal is to maintain or grow steadily the pool of 
family property so that it can be passed down to the next generation” (p.26). Thus 
family would commit to guarding tight control over existing business and avoid 
risky investments and ventures in ambiguous conditions. Local investors such as 
banks and government did not play an important role in the history of business 
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group development, and the influence from these ownership bodies is still quite 
limited in 1980s and 1990s. As mentioned earlier, such distant state-business and 
bank-business association rooted from KMT’s reluctance to see powerful capitalists 
in its rule of the island in early years (Pang, 1992). The local capitalists were 
considered potential threat to the absolute power of the airborne state authority 
rather than precious entrepreneurial assets. Empirical evidence from this study 
implies that family might only make a concession to foreign partner’s request to 
dilute its tight control. Foreign firms would protect their interest by insisting that 
groups adopt efficient combination between strategy and control, and similarly, 
groups with such feature are more attractive to foreign partners. Power dependence 
provides useful lens to interpret the uniqueness of foreign ownership. In most cases, 
foreign companies own the essential technology and expertise that local business 
groups would rely on for competitive advantage in the market. Such resource 
dependence can grant foreign companies greater privilege in their negotiation with 
family than mere ownership would have enabled. In this case, foreign partners may 
have a bigger share in the power pie disproportional to their ownership, which 
endows them with special advantage over other ownership bodies like local 
institutional investors and government. 
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Regarding diversification/control alignment at the director level, neither the 
economic, institutional, nor the power and politics perspectives offers confidence to 
interpret the inter-group difference. Although family is supposed to be a key factor 
in determining the strategic level alignment, no clear pattern is shown by current 
result. Generally, the relationship between alignment and its antecedents and 
outcome is still puzzling. Exploring what these possible factors are and how they 
operate would help build a better theory of strategy and control. Although it makes 
sense that the product and financial markets do not have a foot toe in the inner circle, 
it is surprising that there is no link between insider ownership and director level 
alignment. Usually, strong family dominance indicates high director control, which 
in turn undermines the possibility of achieving a good alignment. Perhaps a 
promising future endeavor is to look at the actual power relationship among major 
shareholders and the specific priority of key decision makers.   
2. Limitation 
While this study critically assesses Chandler’s theoretical scope and antecedents of 
interface between diversification and control in emerging economy, there are several 
limitations.  
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First, the discussion of control depends on the assumption that decision rights are 
actually operationalized to the managerial position. If there is no incontrovertible 
evidence that operational managers are indeed given these rights, it is problematic to 
talk about control at manager level. The “duplicate hierarchy” (Hamilton, 1997) 
operates in a way that goal setting, strategic planning, resource coordination, and 
external buffering concentrate at director level, and most routine managerial tasks 
are endowed to the manager level. Nevertheless, this structure does not exclude that 
operation managers might be simply order implementers. I suggest that the 
directors’ intervention in routine management is more common among smaller 
groups, whereas in larger groups, managerial overload and information overload 
would prevent directors from going into details of daily management. Although 
qualitative research would help to clarify this problem, it is beyond the scope of this 
study.  
Second, the “duplicate hierarchy” also leads to another limitation. Usually, those 
who assume the position of director are typically the founder or his successors, a 
few family members, and some close family affiliates. In contrast, most managers 
have professional management background in terms their education and career, who 
are not necessarily a member of the controlling family. Although the group 
hierarchy is mainly defined and described in terms of the role of position, it is not 
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uncommon that one person occupies multiple positions in both hierarchies, 
especially among older groups. Given that some directors are also operational 
managers elsewhere, it muddies the boundaries of the two management hierarchy. 
This challenge should be more relevant to the inferences drawn at manager level in 
that it is rare for one director to work as a manager under another director’s 
supervision. Therefore, the distribution of control may not be strongly distorted by 
the multi-role phenomenon. At the manager level, however, the “fuzzy” boundary of 
hierarchy would cast doubt on the measure of control and the subsequent findings. 
More information is needed to assess the validity. While the multi-role phenomenon 
makes an empirical puzzle, theoretically I suspect that the deviance of current 
operationalization of control from the real picture may not be substantial. Due to the 
hazard of information overload, managerial overload, and the complexity of 
managerial tasks, it is not likely for a director and manager to intervene the routine 
managerial stuff of other firms.  
Third, one implication in this thesis is that Chandler is better positioned for 
developed markets. Nevertheless, a retrospection of the history between 1870 and 
1920 reminds that even in America there were huge systemic inefficiencies. The M-
from rises in the 1920s as a solution to enhance the managerial efficiency, but in 
much instances inefficiency persists elsewhere. Conglomerates are representative of 
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such inefficiencies. What actually distinguishes developing markets from developed 
ones may be less monitoring and more slack. 
Forth, my panel data has seven-period information for top 100 groups with four-year 
interval. It is open to challenge whether the four-year span is sufficient for the 
market competition, institutional pressures, and power struggle to have their impact 
displayed on alignment. Moreover, the pace of influence from three accounts may 
not necessarily be the same. Some of the effect would take longer to manifest while 
the others would appear promptly, and such pace would vary across groups as well. 
For instance, market competition would have a quicker effect on strategic change or 
group restructuring than other factors on some of the sample. Taking these 
possibilities into account, the empirical findings from the regression model are more 
relevant to discover the direction of each relationship tested, rather than offering 
accurate information for predication.  
Fifth, Taiwan continues to be viewed as an export-oriented economy. In theory, the 
performance of groups would still look good even if there were low alignment, 
because ROA or ROS is demand driven. Moreover, the impact of overseas demand 
favors the ROA and ROS measure for those groups with greater share of export 
business, which means that the volatility of market has asymmetry effect on 
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different groups at different times. While controlling for industry difference and 
between-group difference by assigning each group with a dummy variable somehow 
mitigates such effect, data limitation prevents me to fully explore the influence from 
market demand.  
Sixth, the measure of power and politics might be problematic as well. In this study, 
ownership is just one dimension that affects power relationship among major 
stakeholders of business groups in Taiwan. Such reflection may be inaccurate when 
other existing social structures such as ethnic ties, regional identity and business 
partnership prevail. Thorough exploration to such relationships is beyond the focus 
in this article but they can be a possible direction for future studies. 
3. Conclusion 
This thesis offers a contingency approach to Chandler’s argument on 
strategy/structure alignment. Empirical evidence from the past two decades in 
Taiwan shows that Chandler’s theory does not hold when efficiency based 
competition is not central to the market success, while the benefit of alignment 
begins to emerge as market develops. Since the bulk of previous literature agrees 
that Chandler’s theory of inverse relationship between diversification and control is 
free from context, findings from this thesis offers important complement to 
 - 93 -  
conventional wisdom by suggesting that market moderates the relationship between 
alignment and performance. Notwithstanding the alignment argument derived from 
Chandler is correct in late-industrializing markets, the alignment-performance 
linkage should be examined within certain socio-economic system. Such linkage 
would depend on institutionalized social relationships like “contact” and/or family 
ties that make the core foundation of business group.  
The second contribution of this thesis refers to the exploration of antecedents of 
alignment at both administrative hierarchies of business group. Alignment at the 
manager level is more or less subject to the influence of product and capital market, 
as well as the power landscape of major shareholders within a group. It seems that at 
the manager level, the organizational dynamics in terms of strategy/structure 
interaction is almost similar to those in western industrial enterprises studies by 
Chandler and his followers. The economic, institutional, and power and politics 
accounts that jointly determine the spread of M-form through multibusiness 
organizations appear equally applicable to interpret the diversification/control 
interface in business group. In stark contrast, the exogenous factors exert no effect 
on alignment at the director level, where most important strategic decision making 
like goal setting, strategic planning, resource coordination, and external ties 
concentrates. The inability of market, institutional, and power and politics 
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perspectives to explain alignment at the director level leaves an open area that 
deserves further research. I suggest that family influence be included in the key 
factors based on which the relationship between strategy and structure at the director 
level is determined. The partition of management authority among directors should 
be central to the family’s maneuvers to retain desirable overall governance.  
Finally, the difference between the empirical context of this thesis and most 
previous work done in modern society provides useful implications that supplement 
existing theories. The findings of this thesis can also be generalized to other places 
insofar as the market conditions are similar and strong social relationship like family 
is pervasive among organizations. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Institutional Transitions in Taiwan, 1970s-1990s 





  1) Number of industries deregulated 
  2) Number of public enterprises privatized 









   
Financial Markets 
  4) Average trading volume of equity market 
  5) Average bank loan to private enterprises 









   
Labor Markets 





   
Market Index 





Note:  1) See appendix in Chung, Mahmood, and Feng (2004) for details about the data sources. 2) 
The unit of stock market trading volume is million of shares. 3) The unit for foreign investment and 
bank loan is million Taiwanese dollars and is adjusted by consumer price index based in 1996. 
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Appendix 2. Coding Scheme for Group Ownership 
 
A. Family 
1) Individual shareholders with the same family name of the group founder 
2) Individual shareholder with a different family name but appears in the 
family tree 
B. Affiliate 
1) Firms from the same group 
2) Non-profit organizations such as school, charity foundation or hospital 
from the same group 
3) Individual shareholders who are not family members but are executives, 
including chairman of the board, chief executive, major decision-maker 
or employee of group firms 
C. Institutional Investor 
1) Local companies not affiliated with the group 
2) Local individuals not affiliated with the family 
3) Local non-profit organizations not affiliated with the group 
4) Private banks, insurance companies, investment companies, mutual funds, 
venture capital that are not affiliated with the group 
D. Foreign Investor 
1) Foreign companies not affiliated with the group 
2) Foreign individuals not affiliated with the family 
3) Foreign private banks, insurance companies, investment companies, 
mutual funds, venture capital that are not affiliated with the group 
E. Government 
1) Governmental agencies 
2) Development funds or pension funds 
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Appendix 3. Regression of Return-on-Sales on Alignment and Control Variables 
DV= ROS Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Base Line Main Effect Main Effect Main Effect 
 (1981-1998) (1981-1998) (1981-1990) (1994-1998) 
     
ROS_t-2 0.071 0.012 -0.230* -0.010 
 (0.437) (0.899) (0.106) (0.961) 
Group Age 0.052 0.043 0.128 0.080 
 (0.486) (0.561) (0.283) (0.753) 
Group Sales (Exponentiated) 0.681 1.323 4.066* -2.778 
 (0.512) (0.203) (0.051) (0.510) 
Liability/Assets Ratio -8.420 -6.179 -1.543 -98.558 
 (0.453) (0.575) (0.897) (0.249) 
Market Concentration 4.810* 5.390* 0.507 15.374* 
 (0.094) (0.057) (0.898) (0.097) 
Total Diversification -3.377** -5.403*** -7.623*** -11.959* 
 (0.042) (0.002) (0.010) (0.056) 
Industry Dummies (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
     
Alignment_Dir  -5.131 -1.455 -18.095* 
  (0.121) (0.766) (0.065) 
Alignment_Man  11.089*** 6.481 23.913** 
  (0.001) (0.175) (0.039) 
     
R-square 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.46 
No. of Observations 406 406 237 169 
* p <.10 
** p < .05 
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